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ABSTRACT
For decades, vehicle breakup analysis had been performed for space missions that 
used nuclear heater or power units in order to assess aerospace nuclear safety for 
potential launch failures leading to inadvertent atmospheric reentry.  Such pre-launch risk 
analysis is imperative to assess possible environmental impacts, obtain launch approval, 
and for launch contingency planning.  In order to accurately perform a vehicle breakup 
analysis, the analysis tool should include a trajectory propagation algorithm coupled with 
thermal and structural analyses and influences.  Since such a software tool was not 
available commercially or in the public domain, a basic analysis tool was developed by 
Dr. Angus McRonald prior to this study.  This legacy software consisted of low-fidelity 
modeling and had the capability to predict vehicle breakup, but did not predict the surface
impact point of the nuclear component.
Thus the main thrust of this study was to develop and verify the additional 
dynamics modeling and capabilities for the analysis tool with the objectives to (1) have 
the capability to predict impact point and footprint, (2) increase the fidelity in the 
prediction of vehicle breakup, and (3) reduce the effort and time required to complete an 
analysis.  The new functions developed for predicting the impact point and footprint 
included 3-degrees-of-freedom trajectory propagation, the generation of non-arbitrary 
entry conditions, sensitivity analysis, and the calculation of impact footprint.  The 
functions to increase the fidelity in the prediction of vehicle breakup included a panel 
code to calculate the hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients for an arbitrary-shaped body 
and the modeling of local winds.  The function to reduce the effort and time required to 
complete an analysis included the calculation of node failure criteria.  The derivation and 
xii
development of these new functions are presented in this dissertation, and examples are 
given to demonstrate the new capabilities and the improvements made, with comparisons 
between the results obtained from the upgraded analysis tool and the legacy software 
wherever applicable.
11. Introduction
For decades, vehicle breakup analysis had been performed for space missions that 
used nuclear heater or power units to assess aerospace nuclear safety in the event of a 
launch failure leading to inadvertent atmospheric reentry (see Appendix A). Such pre-
launch risk analysis is imperative to assess environmental impact, obtain launch approval,
and for launch contingency planning.  Work devoted to this area had been ongoing since 
1959 [1] and had been well-documented [2-13].  In more recent years, vehicle breakup 
analysis has also been on the agenda of planetary exploration missions to address 
planetary protection issues, e.g. contamination of Martian soil by Earth microorganisms
(see Appendix B).  Another application of vehicle breakup analysis is in debris analysis
(see Appendix C), where considerable attention was gained due to the 2003 Shuttle 
Columbia accident.  Each area of application of vehicle breakup analysis has slightly 
different objectives, thus requiring different capabilities in the analysis tools.  In this 
document, the research work presented is applicable to the vehicle breakup analysis 
performed for aerospace nuclear safety, specifically those conducted at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory (JPL) for launch approval.  
Vehicle breakup analyses at JPL are performed at the request of the project 
(Aerospace Nuclear Safety Engineer) in support of the risk assessments undertaken by 
the Department of Energy for NASA spacecraft that are planning to use radioisotopes for 
onboard electrical power (e.g., a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator, RTG) or heat 
(e.g., a Light Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit, LWRHU).  The risk assessment early in 
the project is provided for the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) completed by 
NASA.  The final risk assessment, completed later in the project for the DOE Safety 
2Analysis Report (SAR), is a critical element in the process of getting launch approval 
from the President of the United States.  The vehicle breakup analysis for the final risk 
assessment is submitted to the Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel (INSRP) for 
review.  INSRP consists of representatives from NASA, the Department of Defense (the 
Air Force), the Department of Energy, and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
Reference [4] gives a complete roadmap for obtaining launch approval.  
Vehicle breakup analysis performed for risk assessment and hazard evaluation 
provides an estimate of both the vehicle breakup characteristics and the impact point of 
the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) modules carried inside the RTG or the 
LWRHU for various failure scenarios during launch prior to Earth escape.  Given the 
nominal ascent trajectory and burn sequence while in the parking orbit, various failure 
scenarios can be analyzed.  Typically in a failure during ascent, the spacecraft does not 
have enough energy to be captured into orbit and will fall back in a suborbital reentry.  
Failures occurring during most of the ascent in a launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to 
achieve posigrade orbit will result in impact in the Atlantic Ocean.  However, for a few 
seconds late in the ascent prior to achieving orbit, a failure leading to suborbital reentry 
may result in impact on Africa.  After capturing into orbit, a failure occurring while in the 
parking orbit such as a steady misaligned burn (SMB, where the vehicle maintains a 
constant wrong heading in space during the burn and the intermediate staging), an 
incomplete burn, or no burn may lead to out-of-orbit reentry.  An example of a failure 
scenario is the failure to ignite which would eventually lead to reentry due to orbit decay.  
Another example is an SMB which would propel the spacecraft into a specific orbit 
depending on the thrust misalignment, with an out-of-orbit reentry as a possible outcome 
3of the SMB.  Given the onboard fuel, the envelope of reentry conditions consisting of 
entry speeds (V) and flight path angles (Gamma) can be determined and plotted on a V-
Gamma map.
The GPHS module and LWRHU are designed to survive harsh environments, 
whereas their responses to these environments as part the spacecraft become uncertain.  It 
is thus highly desirable for the GPHS module or LWRHU to be released from the 
spacecraft during an inadvertent Earth reentry.  Therefore, the main objectives of the 
vehicle breakup analysis for launch approval and contingency planning are to (1) predict 
vehicle breakup and release of the GPHS modules from the RTG and/or the LWRHU, (2) 
predict nominal impact point and impact conditions of the GPHS modules and/or the 
LWRHU, or the vehicle component containing them, and (3) determine uncertainty in 
impact point prediction in terms of impact footprint. Past missions where vehicle 
breakup analyses were performed for launch approval include Voyager [14], Galileo, 
Ulysses [15], Cassini, and Mars Exploration Rover (MER).  Future missions where 
vehicle breakup analyses could be required include Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) and 
missions to Europa or other outer planets or their moons.  Examples of JPL internal 
documents generated for previous vehicle breakup analyses can be found in Ref. [16-28].
The basic functions required to perform vehicle breakup analysis include 
trajectory simulation, coupled with thermal and structural analyses and influences.  Many 
high-fidelity analysis tools are available in the public domain or on the commercial 
market for performing the trajectory simulation, thermal analysis, and structural analysis 
as separate functions.  Examples of software tools include the Program to Optimize 
Simulated Trajectories (POST) [30] and Atmospheric-Entry, Powered-Landing simulator 
4(AEPL) [31] for trajectory simulation; Systems Improved Numerical Differencing 
Analyzer/Gaski (SINDA/G) [32] and Langley Aerothermodynamic Upwind Relaxation 
Algorithm (LAURA) [33] for thermal analysis; and NASA Structural Analysis computer 
program (NASTRAN) [34], ANSYS [35], and Integrated Modeling of Optical Systems 
(IMOS) [36] for structural analysis.  However, there was no known, accessible analysis 
tool which combined the functions for trajectory propagation, thermal analysis, and 
structural analysis to meet the specific needs of vehicle breakup analysis for applications 
in aerospace nuclear safety.  Thus, a basic analysis tool was developed by Dr. Angus 
McRonald prior to this study.  This legacy software consisted of low-fidelity modeling 
and was used to perform vehicle breakup analysis and predict the outcome of the 
RTG/LWRHU.  However, it did not predict the surface impact point and footprint of the 
RTG/LWRHU or the component carrying the RTG/LWRHU, and such predictions would 
have been provided by another organization, e.g. Air Force Space Command.  The legacy 
software propagated the trajectory by integrating the coupled differential equations for 
the spacecraft's planar translational motion, with the option for a ballistic fall back (zero 
thrust) or a constant body-fixed thrust with decreasing fuel mass; node temperatures are 
calculated by modeling the applicable convective, conductive, and radiative heat transfer; 
and common g-load is calculated based on non-gravitational, perturbing acceleration.  
Two pre-processors were developed:  “V-Gamma Map” calculates the envelope of out-
of-orbit reentry speeds and flight path angles resulting from steady misaligned burns 
while in the parking orbit; “Newtonian Code” (a panel code) calculates the aerodynamic 
coefficients of an axi-symmetric body in hypersonic flow.
5The objectives of this study are to develop and verify new dynamics modeling 
and capabilities for the analysis tool to (1) have the capability to predict impact point and 
footprint, (2) increase the fidelity in the prediction of vehicle breakup, and (3) reduce the 
effort and time required to complete an analysis.  The new functions needed to predict the 
impact point and footprint included 3-degrees-of-freedom (3-DOF) trajectory 
propagation, the generation of non-arbitrary entry conditions for the V-Gamma map, 
sensitivity analysis, and the calculation of impact footprint.  The functions to increase the 
fidelity in the prediction of vehicle breakup included a panel code to calculate the 
hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients for an arbitrary-shaped body and the modeling of 
local winds.  The function to reduce the effort and time required to complete an analysis 
included the calculation of node failure criteria.  A summary of the new functions and the 
resulting improvements is given in Table 1. Note that the functions for predicting the 
impact point and footprint also aid in reducing the effort and time required to complete an 
analysis and allow rapid response during an actual launch contingency since the need for 
another organization to provide this capability would no longer be required.  The 
synthesis of these new development and capabilities to produce a powerful analysis tool 
is an important new contribution to the vehicle breakup analysis performed for aerospace 
nuclear safety.  This dissertation presents the development and verification of the new 
functions discussed above, and examples are given using the vehicle breakup analysis 
performed for the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) mission to demonstrate the 
improvements made.  Comparisons between the results obtained from the upgraded 
analysis tool and the legacy software are also given wherever applicable.
6Table 1.  New Functions and Improvements in Analysis Tool
FunctionsImprovement
Legacy 
Software
Upgraded 
Tool
Comments
2-DOF, planar 
translational 
motion
3-DOF
translational 
motion
2-DOF simulation yields only altitude 
and range for position.  3-DOF 
simulation is needed to produce position 
vector for impact point prediction.
V- map 
produces 
entry V and 
V- map 
produces 
non-
arbitrary 
entry 
condition
V and  together yield only an arbitrary 
point in the air, thus can only predict 
range relative to the arbitrary entry 
point.  Non-arbitrary entry point is 
needed for propagation to predict a 
specific impact point.
N/A Sensitivity 
analysis
Sensitivity analysis needed to produce 
dispersed impact points for the 
calculation of footprint.
Capability to 
predict impact 
point and 
footprint
N/A Calculation 
of footprint
Produces impact footprint based on 
sensitivity analysis.
Panel code for 
axi-symmetric 
body
Panel code 
for 
arbitrary-
shaped body
Vehicle configurations most likely not 
axi-symmetric as components break up
during reentry.  Accuracy in 
aerodynamics is compromised if vehicle 
can only be modeled as axi-symmetric.
Increase
fidelity in 
predictions 
from breakup 
analysis
N/A Modeling of 
local winds
Local winds may cause dispersion in 
impact point and thus enhance accuracy 
of footprint.
Reduce effort 
and time 
required to 
complete an 
analysis
N/A Calculation 
of node 
failure 
criteria
Calculation of node failure criteria based 
on integrated heating was done by hand 
before implementation into upgraded 
tool, thus time-consuming.
The process of performing vehicle breakup analysis using the upgraded system is 
described in Figure 1 for a single-case run.  The general methodology in performing 
vehicle breakup analysis does not change with the implementation of the new dynamics 
modeling and capabilities, although the results from the analysis become more complete, 
7more accurate, and are obtained in shorter amount of time.  A detailed discussion on the 
process of performing vehicle breakup analysis is given in Appendix D.
Figure 1.  Process of Performing Vehicle Breakup Analysis
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82. Development of New Dynamics Modeling and Capabilities
The new dynamics modeling and capabilities for the analysis tool are listed below 
and are discussed in the following sections.
• 3-DOF trajectory propagation
• Non-arbitrary entry conditions in V-Gamma map
• Panel code for arbitrary-shaped body
• Modeling of local winds
• Sensitivity analysis
• Calculation of impact footprint
• Node failure criteria.  
2.1 Coordinate Systems
All coordinate systems employed are defined by a set of three ortho-normal basis 
functions. In the following sections, the symbol bax
v
 denotes a vector x as observed in the 
a-frame and projected onto b-frame coordinates (referenced to a-frame and expanded in 
terms of b-frame base vectors).  The definitions of the various reference frames are given 
below: 
1) Inertial frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  I I Ix y ze e e ):  non-rotating, geocentric frame.  The z-axis is along the 
Earth axis of rotation and points towards the North Pole.  The x-z plane contains the 
spacecraft at trajectory initiation (t=0).
2) Rotating frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  R R Rx y ze e e ):  rotating, geocentric frame.  The axes of the rotating 
and inertial frames are identical at simulation initialization.  The rotating frame then 
drifts from the inertial frame at Earth’s angular rate.
93) Navigation or REN frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  n n nre e e  ):  moving frame centered at the spacecraft 
center-of-gravity (c.g.).  The r, , and  axes are radial, due East, and due North 
tangent to the local meridian, respectively.  The  and  axes lie in the local 
horizontal plane, and the r-axis is upwards along the local vertical normal to the 
geoid.
4) Velocity frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  v v vx y ze e e ):  moving frame centered at the spacecraft c.g.  Also 
known as the stability axes.  The x-axis is along the spacecraft air-relative velocity 
vector.  The y-axis remains horizontal locally, and the z-axis points downwards.
5) Body frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  b b bx y ze e e ):  moving frame centered at the spacecraft c.g.  A special 
case is the principal axes where the moment of inertia tensor is a diagonal matrix.  
The x-axis is along the axis of aerodynamic symmetry (zero lift line) and points 
towards the nose.  The z-axis points down in the plane of geometric symmetry.  
6) Orbit frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,o o ox y ze e e ):  time-dependent, geocentric frame.  The x-axis extends 
through the perigee, and the z-axis is along the angular momentum vector normal to 
the orbit plane.  
The matrices for transforming between the various reference frames are given in
Appendix E.
2.2 3-DOF Trajectory Propagation
The derivation of the kinematics and dynamics to formulate the equations of 
motion for 3-DOF trajectory propagation is given in Appendix F.  Validation of the 
propagator is performed by comparing the trajectories generated by the upgraded analysis 
10
tool and ACAPS, a formal software used for aerocapture studies [37].  The initial 
conditions and vehicle characteristics for the test case were:
Altitude = 121.86 km
Relative speed = 5681.27 m/sec
Relative flight path angle = -14.97 deg
Latitude = -41.64 deg
Longitude = 270.73 deg
Azimuth = 95.19 deg
Mass = 1883.0 kg
CD = 1.55
Aref = 11.04 m2
The comparisons of the time histories of the altitude, relative velocity, and 
relative flight path angle are given in Figure 2.  Note that “Base” in the plots denotes the 
upgraded analysis tool.
11
Altitude vs Time
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
0 100 200 300 400 500
Time (sec)
Al
tit
u
de
 
(m
)
Base
ACAPS
(a)
Relative Velocity vs Time
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0 100 200 300 400 500
Time (sec)
Re
la
tiv
e 
Ve
lo
ci
ty
 
(m
/s
ec
)
Base
ACAPS
(b)
Relative Flight Path Angle vs Time
-100
-90
-80
-70
-60
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
0 100 200 300 400 500
Time (sec)
Re
la
tiv
e 
Fl
ig
ht
 
Pa
th
 
An
gl
e 
(de
g) Base
ACAPS
(c)
Figure 2.  Comparison of (a) Altitude, (b) Relative Velocity, and (c) Relative Flight 
Path Angle vs Time for Validation of Trajectory Propagation
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2.3 Non-Arbitrary Entry Conditions in V-Gamma Map
To determine the initial entry condition for trajectory propagation in an out-of-
orbit reentry resulting from an SMB while in the parking orbit, the legacy software 
generates the speed and flight path angle at the entry altitude, without the calculation of 
the entry latitude, longitude, and azimuth.  This results in an arbitrary entry condition, 
thus only ground track relative to the arbitrary entry point can be predicted.  In order to 
predict potential impact point s of the radioisotope power system, e.g. in terms of latitude 
and longitude, a non-arbitrary entry condition is needed.  To attain this added capability, 
the modeling of inertial-fixed thrust in an SMB and the determination of a non-arbitrary 
entry condition in an out-of-orbit reentry were developed.
2.3.1 Applications of V-Gamma Map
A spectrum of reentry conditions consisting of entry speeds, V, and flight path 
angles, Gamma, can be derived from the assumptions of (1) SMB in the execution of the 
parking orbit burn sequence, and (2) an otherwise nominal, time-delayed sequence of 
burns while in the parking orbit.  The possible outcomes of the SMB consist of the 
following categories [39]: 
1) Hyperbolic escape (HE):  The spacecraft has reached hyperbolic speed and is 
not on a path that enters the atmosphere.
2) Orbit decay reentry (DEL): The perigee of the final orbit is above the 
atmosphere, so that reentry occurs after a period of orbit decay.
3) Powered reentry (PWE):  The reentry occurs while the burns are in progress, 
and the spacecraft has not separated from the launch vehicle.
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4) Prompt reentry (ELP):  The burns have finished prior to reentry but the 
vehicle is then on a downward path approaching a perigee within the 
atmosphere.
5) Delayed reentry (ELD):  The vehicle is on an upward path at the end of the 
burns and will reenter the atmosphere after passing though an apogee.
6) Prompt hyperbolic reentry (HP):  The vehicle has an escape speed but will 
reenter the atmosphere and may exit and fall into the HES or ELD categories.
7) Circular Orbit Decay (COD):  The spiral case of COD is due to failed burns 
from parking orbit.  It is a single point at near circular orbit speed with near 
zero flight path angle.
The envelope of reentry conditions in prompt, delayed, and powered reentries is 
plotted on a V-Gamma map.  An example of a V-Gamma map is given in Figure 3.  The 
hyperbolic escape category will not appear on the V-Gamma map since it does not lead to 
reentry.  In the orbit decay reentry category, typically the initial elliptical orbit will 
eventually decay into a circular orbit, and then continues as a COD which is represented 
by a single point on the V-Gamma map.  The entry point and time of entry of an orbit 
decay reentry are arbitrary, thus only the impact point relative to the assumed entry point 
can be predicted. 
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Figure 3. Example of V-Gamma Map
The points within the V-Gamma map are not restricted to the SMB failure 
scenario; for example, the outcomes of partial burns and no burn are also points within 
the V-Gamma map.  Therefore, a given V-Gamma pair within the map may correspond to 
multiple failure scenarios, and thus the entry point is not unique.  However, the points 
about the V-Gamma map (on the boundary of the V-Gamma map) are restricted to the 
SMB failure scenario.  Although the SMB may not be a highly probable failure scenario, 
it does provide an envelope which encompasses everywhere that the vehicle can get to, 
given the onboard fuel.  For each point about the V-Gamma map consisting of the 
powered, prompt, or delayed entry category, a non-arbitrary entry condition can be 
determined and associated with it is a specific impact point which can be predicted 
through trajectory propagation with breakup analysis.  Thus, by analyzing a set of 
“cardinal points” which is fairly distributed about the V-Gamma map to form an entry 
ellipse, a corresponding bounding impact footprint can be determined.  This bounding 
o ELD
+   ELP
* PWE
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footprint also envelops the impact points of the various failure scenarios corresponding to 
the points within the V-Gamma map.
2.3.2 Modeling of Inertial-Fixed Thrust
The thrust misalignment in a SMB is assumed fixed in the inertial frame.  Thus, 
the modeling of inertial-fixed thrust was developed for propagating a SMB in the burn 
sequence executed while in the parking orbit.  The thrust is assumed to be along the body 
x-axis:  
ˆ
b b
thrust thrust xF F e=
v
(1) 
where Fthrust is the thrust force and bthrustF
v
 is the thrust vector in body frame coordinates.  
The thrust misalignment is defined by the cone and clock angles, which are offsets 
between the body and velocity frames.  The cone angle is measured in the sideslip plane 
with 0º as the nominal burn, and the clock angle is about the body x-axis such that a 90º 
cone and 90º clock yield an upward thrust.  The thrust vector is time-invariant in the 
inertial frame, obtained by:
(0) (0)I I v bthrust v b thrustF C C F=
v v
(2) 
where: IthrustF
v
= thrust in inertial frame coordinates
(0)IvC = matrix for transforming from velocity frame to inertial frame at the 
start of the burn sequence
(0)vbC = matrix for transforming from body frame to velocity frame at the start 
of the burn sequence by setting  = 0, 	 = cone, and 
 = clock
The thrust vector is transformed from the inertial frame to the velocity frame coordinates 
at every timestep as a forcing function in the equations of motion:
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( ) ( )v v Ithrust I thrustF t C t F=
v v
(3) 
2.3.3 Outcome of Steady Misaligned Burn
Given the pair of cone and clock angles, the burn sequence is simulated by 
numerical integration of the equations of motion.  Aerodynamic drag is not considered
for the exo-atmospheric trajectory, and the J2 gravitation model is used.  At the end of the 
last burn, the semi-major axis (a), eccentricity (e), and radius of perigee (rp) are obtained 
by [48]: 
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E
E I
r
a
rv
µ
µ=  (4) 
( )2cos1 I I
E
rv
e
a

µ=  (5) 
(1 )pr a e=  (6) 
where: µE = gravitational-mass constant of Earth
r = spacecraft position radius
vI = inertial speed
I = inertial flight path angle
The outcome of the SMB is then determined by the following:
1. The outcome is a powered entry if entry occurs before the end of the last burn.
2. The outcome is a hyperbolic escape if a < 0 or e > 1.
3. The outcome is an orbit decay if it is not a hyperbolic escape and the perigee 
is above the atmosphere.
4. The outcome is a delayed entry if it is not a hyperbolic escape or orbit decay, 
and I > 0.
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5. The outcome is a prompt entry if it is not a hyperbolic escape or orbit decay, 
and I < 0.
Continuing from the end of the last burn, the next course of action is dependent on the 
category of the SMB outcome as described below:
1. For prompt and powered entries, the trajectory propagation by numerical 
integration of the equations of motion continues until the reentry altitude is 
reached and the entry condition is obtained.  
2. For hyperbolic escape and orbit decay categories, the trajectory propagation 
terminates and only end-of-burn condition is determined.  
3. For a delayed entry, the time to reentry relative to the start of the burn 
sequence may be prolonged, making numerical integration of the equations of 
motion impractical.  Therefore, Keplerian motion is assumed, and the reentry 
condition is obtained by orbital mechanics.
The determination of entry condition for delayed entry is given in the next subsection.
2.3.4 Entry Condition for Delayed Reentry
At the end of the burn sequence in a delayed reentry, the semi- latus rectum (p) is:
2(1 )p a e=  (7) 
By the definition of delayed entry, the current true anomaly (f) is:
1cos ,         0p rf f
er
  = <     (8) 
The true anomaly at entry interface (fEI), or EI, is:
1cos ,        2EIEI EI
EI
p rf f
er
   = < <    (9) 
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The inertial flight path angle at EI (I_EI) is:
1
_
sin
tan
1 cos
EI
I EI
EI
e f
e f
  =  + 
(10)
I_EI is negative.  The inertial speed at EI (vI_EI) is:
_
2 1
I EI E
EI
v
r a
µ  =    (11)
Given the position and velocity vectors in inertial frame coordinates ( Irv  and IIv
v ), the 
angular momentum vector ( IH
v
) is calculated:
I I I
IH r v= ×
v v v (12)
The inclination is obtained by [48]: 
1cos z
Hi
H
  =    
v (13)
where HZ is the z-component of IH
v
, and H
v
is the magnitude of the angular 
momentum.  To capture the correct sign and angle, the longitude of the ascending node is 
obtained using [48]: 
sin ( )
sin
cos ( )
sin
x
LAN z
y
LAN z
H
sign H
H i
H
sign H
H i
 =
 = 
v
v
where HX and HY are the x and y components of IH
v
.  This yields the following:
1 sintan
cos
LAN
LAN
LAN
   =   
(14)
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The longitude of the ascending node is between 0º and 360º.  To capture the correct sign 
and angle, the argument of periapsis is obtained using [48]: 
sin( )
sin
cos( ) sec sin cos
sin
I
z
AOP
I I
x z
AOP LAN LAN
rf
r i
r rf i
r r i


+ =
 + =  +   
where Ixr  and 
I
zr  are the x and z components of the spacecraft position vector in the 
inertial frame coordinates.  This yields the following:
1 sin( )tan
cos( )
AOP
AOP
AOP
f ff
 
  +=  + 
 (15)
The argument of periapsis is between 0º and 360º.  The position vector at EI in orbit 
frame coordinates ( oEIr
v ) is:
ˆ ˆcos sino o oEI EI EI x EI EI yr r f e r f e= +v (16)
The position vector at EI in inertial coordinates is obtained by transformation:
, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
I I I I I I I o
EI x x EI y y EI z z o EIr e r e r e C r+ + = v
where 
,
I
EI xr , ,
I
EI yr , and ,
I
EI zr  are the x, y, and z components of 
I
EIr
v
.  Another expression 
for the position vector in inertial frame coordinates is:
ˆ ˆ ˆcos cos cos sin sinI I I IEI EI EI EI x EI EI EI y EI EI zr r e r e r e  =  +  +v
Thus, the latitude at entry is obtained by:
,1sin
I
EI z
EI
EI
r
r
   =   
(17)
The celestial longitude at entry is obtained by:
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,1
,
tan
I
EI y
EI I
EI x
r
r
   =    
(18)
To obtain the azimuth, the velocity vector at entry is first obtained:
_ _
o
o EI
I EI I EI o
EI
H r
v v
H r
 × =  × 
v vv v v (19)
The inertial velocity vector is transformed to the inertial frame coordinates by:
_
ˆ ˆ ˆ
I I I I o
EI x EI y EI z o I EIU e V e W e C v+ + = v (20)
where UEI, VEI, and WEI are the x, y, and z components of the inertial velocity vector at 
entry interface in the inertial frame coordinates.  Transforming to the inertial velocity 
frame coordinates using Equation (79), the azimuth at entry interface (
_I EI ) is obtained 
from the second component:
1
_
s c
tan
s c s s c
EI EI EI EI
I EI
EI EI EI EI EI EI EI EI
U V
U V W
   
    + =  !    +" # (21)
The mean orbit rate (n) is:
3
En
a
µ=
The eccentric anomaly (E) is:
1cos
a rE
ae
  =   
The entry time relative to the current time (tEI) is obtained from:
1 cos
dE n
dt e E
= 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(sin sin )EI EI
EI
E E e E E
t
n
  = (22)
The terrestrial longitude at EI (EI) is calculated using:
EI EI EIt =   (23)
where  is the Earth’s rate of rotation.
2.3.5 Validation of Non-Arbitrary Entry Conditions
The burn sequence in the test case consisted of two burns separated by a coast 
period.  Staging is not simulated explicitly in the original V-Gamma map but is done in 
the new software.  Thus, the conditions of the staging in the test case are set to those at 
the start and end of the second burn to be consistent with the original V-Gamma map.  
The burn sequence is described in Table 2.
Table 2.  Burn Sequence for Test Case
Event Time (sec) Mass (kg)
Start of burn 1
(Isp = 313.9 sec)
0.0 16800
End of burn 1 158.3 11700
First staging 230.3 7251
Start of burn 2
(Isp = 292.5 sec)
230.3 7251
End of burn 2 317.3 2800
Second staging 317.3 2800
The vehicle state at the start of the first burn is given below:
Altitude = 180.0 km
Relative velocity = 7373.9 m/sec
Latitude = 28.0 deg
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Longitude = 0.0 deg
Relative flight path angle = 0.0
Relative azimuth = 90.0 deg
A range of 0º to 180º for the cone angle and a range of -90º to 90º for the clock 
angle were analyzed at incremental stepsizes of 2º, resulting in 8281 pairs of cone and 
clock angles.  For validation, the resulting V, Gamma, and time were compared with 
those calculated from the original V-Gamma map software and are given in Table 3 for 
selected sample pairs of cone and clock angles.  For prompt, delayed, and powered 
entries, the V, Gamma, and time at entry are compared.  For the hyperbolic escape and 
orbit decay categories, the V and Gamma at the end of the last burn are compared.
Table 3.  Comparison of V, Gamma, and Time at Entry or End of Last Burn
V (km/s) Gamma (deg) Time (sec)Cone 
(deg)
Clock 
(deg)
Category
Original 
VG
New 
VG
Original 
VG
New 
VG
Original 
VG
New 
VG
154 -76 PWE 6.96 6.95 -6.32 -6.31 172.7 174.0
166 20 PWE 5.48 5.50 -8.84 -8.72 282.5 286.5
94 -12 PWE 8.38 8.36 -3.75 -3.74 295.6 299.0
140 32 ELP 5.10 5.22 -10.90 -10.43 496.5 493.5
150 50 ELP 4.38 4.57 -13.99 -13.11 488.7 475.5
118 12 ELP 6.83 6.82 -4.78 -4.79 568.5 555.0
134 32 ELD 5.44 5.54 -11.45 -11.12 594.6 590.0
120 18 ELD 6.59 6.60 -6.79 -6.68 677.6 664.6
152 80 ELD 4.10 4.33 -17.96 -17.18 534.0 532.4
22 -82 HE 11.83 11.57 3.25 2.96 N/A N/A
12 66 HE 11.39 11.16 14.04 13.31 N/A N/A
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32 8 HE 11.17 10.95 10.92 10.32 N/A N/A
46 -36 DEL 11.29 11.06 0.12 -0.04 N/A N/A
92 -4 DEL 8.76 8.64 -0.63 -0.70 N/A N/A
100 4 DEL 8.08 8.00 1.04 0.89 N/A N/A
Note:  VG denotes V-Gamma map.
The other state variables for a non-arbitrary entry point including the time, 
latitude, longitude, and azimuth calculated from orbital mechanics for delayed entry were 
validated for selected sample pairs of cone and clock angles by strictly propagating the 
trajectory until the entry altitude is reached, and the results are given in Table 4.
Table 4.  Comparison of Entry Time, Latitude, Longitude, and Azimuth for Delayed 
Entry
Time (sec) Latitude (deg) Longitude (deg) Azimuth (deg)Cone 
(deg)
Clock 
(deg) New 
VG
Propagate New 
VG
Propagate New 
VG
Propagate New 
VG
Propagate
140 52 657.17 657.0 29.32 28.74 34.17 34.18 88.80 88.75
124 20 605.64 605.5 32.27 32.24 37.61 37.60 81.06 80.48
126 26 672.40 672.5 32.37 32.26 40.28 40.30 83.43 83.02
132 34 654.30 654.5 31.31 31.13 37.09 37.12 83.76 83.32
130 48 857.18 857.0 31.70 29.96 45.17 45.17 91.61 91.81
128 40 826.54 826.5 32.21 31.23 45.66 45.69 89.40 89.43
120 14 560.72 561.0 32.23 32.23 36.29 36.31 79.71 79.09
The entry angle-of-attack for powered reentry was validated for selected sample 
pairs of cone and clock angles against the original V-Gamma map and presented in Table 
5. 
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Table 5.  Comparison of Entry Angle-of-Attack for Powered Entry
Angle-of-Attack (deg)Cone (deg) Clock (deg)
Original VG New VG
176 52 157.50 157.60
58 -64 42.24 42.23
166 8 150.63 150.86
86 -74 69.83 69.83
178 80 157.89 157.39
110 -18 95.67 96.39
160 20 142.49 143.17
The differences in the comparisons shown in Table 3 to Table 5 are due to 
differences in the approach for trajectory propagation.  In the original V-Gamma map 
software, numerical integration of the equations of motion is performed only during the 
burn periods; the point mass gravitation model is used; and Keplerian motion is assumed 
during the periods of no thrust, e.g. the coast periods.  The approach for trajectory 
propagation in the new V-Gamma map software is described in the Section 2.3.3.  The 
propagation method numerically integrates the equations of motion until entry altitude is 
reached, and the J2 gravitation model is used.
2.4 Panel Code for Hypersonic Aerodynamic Coefficients
Vehicle breakup typically occurs during the hypersonic regime of the reentry, and 
the vehicle may change into various configurations as its components fail or break off 
during the breakup sequence.  Therefore, it is necessary to determine the hypersonic 
aerodynamic properties of various vehicle configurations and components for 
atmospheric trajectory propagation and breakup analysis. A panel code developed as part 
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of the legacy software system generated hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients for an axi-
symmetric body based on Newtonian theory for hypersonic flow.  However, the various 
configurations of the vehicle during the breakup sequence are most likely not axi-
symmetric.  Therefore, to increase the fidelity in the modeling of aerodynamics for the 
trajectory propagation and breakup predictions, a panel code employing triangular panels 
was developed to calculate the hypersonic aerodynamic force and moment coefficients as 
functions of angle-of-attack, sideslip angle, and bank angle for an arbitrary-shaped body.
Newtonian theory assumes that in hypersonic flow the shock wave wraps around 
the vehicle like a glove [51].  When particles in the flow impact the vehicle, the normal 
momentum is transferred to the surface, but the tangential momentum is preserved [49].
Typically, the force and moment coefficients generated based on Newtonian theory for 
hypersonic flow will contain prediction errors due to simplification in the modeling of
fluid dynamics.  However, compared to the highly-accurate wind tunnels and 
computational fluid dynamics (CFD) which are costly and time-consuming, the 
prediction errors from the panel code are tolerable considering the savings in cost and 
time where the efficiency is multiplied by the number of vehicle configurations 
encountered in the breakup sequence.  Therefore, in application to vehicle breakup 
analysis, the panel code is a less expensive and favorable alternative to wind tunnels and 
CFD for generating hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients.  
Typically, existing panel codes employ rectangular or quadrilateral panels and are 
useful for relatively simple shapes; e.g. an axi-symmetric shape or body of planar 
symmetry.  An example of a panel code employing quadrilateral panels is the 
Aerodynamic Preliminary Analysis System II [50].  Since vehicle breakup analyses often 
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assume simple but odd-shaped bodies for the various vehicle configurations, the 
modeling of rectangular/quadrilateral panels may pose a challenge for the user to set up 
the coordinates carefully in order to satisfy the requirement that the four vertices of each 
rectangular/quadrilateral panel need to be co-planar.  This led to the development of the 
panel code employing triangular panels to allow easy problem setup.  Since the three 
vertices of a triangular panel are always co-planar, the user can define coordinates to 
simply outline the profile and cross-section of an arbitrary-shaped body.  With the 
flexibility in using triangular panels, the cross-sections along the centerline of the body 
do not need to be parallel to each other; a cross-section does not need to be normal to the 
centerline; and a cross-section does not need to be planar, e.g. part of the cross-sectional 
area can exhibit a deflection angle or include an appendage or a chamfer.  
2.4.1 Calculation of Hypersonic Aerodynamic Coefficients
From Newtonian theory for hypersonic flow, the pressure coefficient (CP) for a 
surface exposed to the flow is [49]: 
2
,max cosp pC C = (24)
where Cp,max is the maximum pressure at the stagnation point and  is the angle between 
the unit vector inward normal to the surface and the velocity vector.  Cp,max is 2 in 
Newtonian theory and approximately 1.84 in modified Newtonian theory.  
2.4.2 Modeling of Triangular Panels
A body of arbitrary shape at an angle-of-attack () and the coordinate systems are 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  Definitions of Variables and Coordinate Systems
For the particular coordinate systems defined in Figure 4, the matrix ( bvC ) to 
transform from the velocity frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,v v vx y ze e e ) to the body frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,b b bx y ze e e ) with -	-
rotation is:
sin cos cos sin cos sin
cos cos
sin sin sin cos
sin cos cos cos sin
sin sin cos sin sin sin
sin cos
sin cos cos cos
b
vC
	   	   	    
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     !   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where  is the angle-of-attack, 	 is the sideslip angle, and  is the bank angle.  Note that 
the matrix to transform from body to velocity frame ( vbC ) is:
( )Tv bb vC C=
A
B
C
ˆ
n
e
a
b
c
h
d D
ˆ
b
xe
ˆ
b
ze
ˆ
b
ye
C
v


ˆ
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ˆ
b
xe
ˆ
b
ze
V$
v
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In the velocity frame, the freestream velocity vector (V$
v
) is:
ˆ
v
xV V e$ $=
v
Transforming to the body frame, the freestream velocity vector is then:
( )ˆ ˆ ˆcos cos sin sin cosx y zV V e e e 	 	  	$ $=  +v (26)
A panel is defined by the three vertices A(xA, yA, zA), B(xB, yB, zB), and C(xC, yC, zC), 
which form the vectors A , B , and C  with respect to the origin as seen in Figure 4.  The 
inward normal unit vector ( ˆne ) of the panel is calculated by:
n AB AC= ×uuuv uuuvv
ˆ
n n
e
n
=
v
v (27)
where: AB = vector from point A to point B ( AB  = B A vv )
AC
uuuv
= vector from point A to point C ( AC
uuuv
 = C Av v )
n
v
= vector inward normal to panel surface
Let a BC= uuuv , b AC= uuuv , and c AB= uuuv , where BC  is the vector from point B to point 
C ( BC C B= uuuv v v ).  Then, the area of the panel is obtained by:
2 2 2
2
c b ad
b
+ =
2 2h c d= 
2
bh
area = (28)
From Figure 4, the centroid of the panel relative to the origin ( centroidr
v ) is calculated by:
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( )dAD ACb=uuuv uuuv
D A AD= + uuuvvv
DB B D= uuuv v v
'
3
DBDh =
uuuvuuuv
 
'
3
b dAb AC
b
+ =   
uuuv uuuv
ˆ ˆ ˆ' '
b b b
centroid centroid x centroid y centroid zr A Ab Dh x e y e z e= + + = + +
uuuv uuuvvv (29)
The cosine of the angle between the velocity and normal unit vectors (cos ) is:
ˆ
ˆ
ˆcos
ˆ
n
n
n
V e V e
V e
 $ $
$
•= = •
v
v (30)
From Equations (24) and (30), Cp can be obtained for each panel.  The pressure 
coefficient as given in Equation (24) describes the inward normal force per unit area 
acting upon the centroid of the panel and non-dimensionalized by the freestream dynamic 
pressure.  At a panel, the force coefficients outward normal (CN), tangential (CA), and 
outward from the side (CY) relative to the body centerline are:
{ }
ˆ
1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
i i i i i
Tb
x
b
A Y N p i n y
ref b
z
e
C C C C area e e
A
e
' () )= * +) ), -
(31)
where Aref is the reference area and i is the index of the panel.  The pitching (Cm), yawing 
(Cn), and rolling (Cl) moment coefficients from each panel are:
( ) ( ) ( )' ˆ ˆ ˆi i i ib b bcentroid centroid cg x centroid cg y centroid cg zr x x e y y e z z e=  +  + v
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{ } { }'1i i i i i il m n centroid A Y NC C C r C C Cl= ×v (32)
where: (xcg, ycg, zcg) = coordinates of the center of gravity (c.g.) relative to the origin
l = reference length
'
centroidr
v
= centroid of panel relative to the c.g.
The force and moment coefficients for the body (CA, CY, CN, Cl, Cm, Cn) are then 
obtained by summing up the contributions at the centroid of all the panels.  For example,
iN N
i
C C= . (33)
The lift (CL), drag (CD), and side force (CS) coefficients normal and tangential to the 
velocity vector are obtained by:
D A
v
S b Y
L N
C C
C C C
C C
' (' () ) ) )=* + * +) ) ) ), - , -
(34)
Note that the drag coefficient of a randomly tumbling body can be obtained by taking the 
average of the drag coefficients at all orientations; e.g. by sweeping across the angle-of-
attacks, sideslip angles, and bank angles, and taking the average of the resultant drag 
coefficients.
The panel code does not take into consideration the shadowing of the forward part 
onto the back part in the vehicle [51].  For example, the presence of a “valley” in the 
vehicle shape will result in a higher drag prediction near zero angle-of-attack.
2.4.3 Adaptation to Axi-Symmetric Body
For an axi-symmetric body, the profile is given by n-pairs of coordinates (x, r)j, 
where j = 1, 2, …, n.  Thus, conversion to (x, y, z)j,k coordinates is necessary, where k = 
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1, 2, … m+1, and m is the number of panels in the xj-th cross-section.  For example, 
given 10 pairs of (x, r) coordinates for an axi-symmetric body and each cross-section 
consists of 120 panels, a conversion would yield 10 x 121 = 1210 points in the input 
array of (x, y, z) coordinates.  The conversion is:
,
,
,
sin[( 1) ]
cos[( 1) ]
j k j
j k j
j k j
x x
y r k
z r k
/
/
=
=   0
=  0
 (35)
where:
2
m
/0 = (36)
Note that for an axi-symmetric body, the determination of the aerodynamic coefficients 
can be simplified by reducing the angle-of-attack and sideslip angle to just one angle, 
represented by the total angle-of-attack.
2.4.4 Validation of Panel Code
Given the (x, y, z) coordinates for the vertices of the triangular panels for an 
arbitrary-shaped body, the hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients as functions of angle-of-
attack, sideslip angle, and bank angle are calculated by the panel code.  The coefficients
include:  lift, drag, and velocity-frame side-force coefficients (CL, CD, CS); normal, axial, 
and body-frame side-force coefficients (CN, CA, CY); and rolling, pitching, and yawing 
moment coefficients (Cl, Cm, Cn). 
Two test cases are analyzed for the validation of the panel code and are presented 
in the following subsections.  The first test case is an axi-symmetric, sharp-nose, circular 
cone, where the aerodynamic coefficients were predicted using Newtonian theory and 
documented in Ref. [52].  The second test case is a non-axisymmetric hypersonic vehicle 
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consisting of a spherically blunted cone with a slice parallel with the axis of the vehicle, 
and a flap is attached.  The aerodynamic coefficients obtained from wind tunnel data are 
provided in Ref. [53]. 
For a blunt body, the total drag is mostly due to pressure drag.  As the body 
becomes more slender, the contribution of drag due to skin friction and base drag to the 
overall drag increases.  Therefore, Newtonian theory works better for objects such as a 
sharp cone [54], and a Cp,max of 2 is used in the panel code for the two test cases.
2.4.5 Test Case 1:  Sharp-Nose, Circular Cone
The first test case examined for the verification of the panel code was an axi-
symmetric, sharp-nose, circular cone with a half angle of 30º and a flat base.  The test 
data were obtained from Table XXI of Ref. [52] where CN, CA, and CY as functions of 
angle-of-attack and sideslip angle were obtained based on Newtonian theory.  Excellent 
comparisons were produced, and the comparisons of the aerodynamic coefficients are 
given in Figure 5 through Figure 7.  Note that “Beta” is the sideslip angle, “Test” denotes 
the test data from Ref. [52], and “Panel” denotes the data obtained from the panel code.
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Figure 5.  Comparison of CN in Sharp-Nose, Circular Cone Test Case
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Figure 7.  Comparison of CY in Sharp-Nose, Circular Cone Test Case
2.4.6 Test Case 2:  A Hypersonic Vehicle
The second test case was a non-axisymmetric hypersonic vehicle of planar 
symmetry as shown in Figure 8.  The vehicle consisted of a spherically blunted cone with 
a slice parallel with the axis of the vehicle, and a flap is attached.  The flap can be 
deflected at 0º, 10º, 20º, or 30º.  The reference area was 11.525 in2; the reference length 
was 4 in; and the c.g. was at half the body length.  
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Figure 8.  Hypersonic Vehicle
Wind tunnel data as a function of the angle-of-attack were provided in Ref. [53] 
for the following:
1. CN, CA, and Cm for a flap deflection angle (
) of 0º
2. CN and CA for 
 = 10º
3. CA for 
 = 20º
4. CA for 
 = 30º
The aerodynamic coefficients generated from the panel code are compared with 
the wind tunnel data and plotted in Figure 9 through Figure 12.  Ref. [53] defined its 
angle-of-attack as “positive when slice is on windward side”, which yields the opposite 
sign as the angle-of-attack defined in Figure 4.  Therefore, in the outputs of the panel 
code, the angle-of-attack, CN, and Cm were multiplied by -1 to adjust for this difference in 
2.188
7.274
9.352
4.000
10.391
10º
10º 30º
20º10ºR.200
(All dimensions in inches) 
(Not to scale)
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sign.  Note that the panel code was able to correctly determine the non-zero pitching 
moment at zero angle-of-attack in Figure 9 resulting from the slice in the cone.
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Figure 9.  Comparisons of (a) CN, (b) Cm, and (c) CA for Hypersonic Vehicle with 0º 
Flap Deflection Angle
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The root mean squares of the differences between the aerodynamic coefficients 
generated from the panel code and the wind tunnel are given in Table 6.  The differences 
are mostly due to simplification in the modeling of fluid dynamics in Newtonian theory 
used in the panel code.
Table 6.  Root Mean Squares of Differences in Aerodynamic Coefficients
Flap Deflection Angle CA CN Cm
0º 0.012 0.003 0.007
10º 0.011 0.012 N/A
20º 0.004 N/A N/A
30º 0.018 N/A N/A
2.5 Calculations of Failure Criteria
In general, the failure integrated heating per unit area (0Qfail in J/cm2) for a 
component is:
( )( )fail radflow
mc TQ Q
A HF EF
00 = + 0 (37)
where c is the material specific heat (kJ/(kg·K)) and 0T is the rise temperature from 
current condition to node failure (K); e.g., melting or zero strength temperature subtract 
273 K.  The radiative cooling, 0Qrad, is approximated by:
4(0.65 )rad melt heatup phaseQ T t10 =  0  (38)
where 0theatup phase is the time duration of the heatup phase;  is the Stefan-Boltzman 
constant; 1 is the emissivity; and Tmelt is the melting temperature. For example, the 
failure integrated heating for a hollow cylinder is calculated by:
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2 2( )
2 ( )( )
outer inner
fail rad
outer
c T r rQ Q
r HF EF
20 0 = + 0 (39)
where: 2 = material density (g/cm3)
router = outer radius of hollow cylinder (cm)
rinner = inner radius of hollow cylinder (cm)
For a good conductor or a spinning cylinder subject to constant exposure to the flow, the 
conductive heating term (first term) on the right-hand-side is multiplied by .
The failure criteria for specific spacecraft components are given in the following 
subsections.  Before the implementation of the calculation of failure criteria into the 
upgraded analysis tool, the failure criteria were calculated by hand.  Verification of the 
calculation of failure criteria was done by comparing with the hand-calculations, and 
therefore not presented here.
2.5.1 Aeroshell
The failure criteria for the aeroshell may be provided.  If unavailable, the failure 
criteria can be calculated based on the design margin.  A heatshield (H/S) is generally 
designed to 100% margin on the nominal entry heating, with 22% on the backshell (B/S) 
and 60% on the shoulder.  The failure integrated heating values are thus:
_ /
_ /
_ /
_ /
_
2
0.22 
0.6 
( )( )
nom
fail H S rad
fail H S
fail B S rad
fail H S
fail shoulder rad
QQ Q
EF
QQ Q
EF
QQ Q
HF EF
0 = + 0
00 = + 0
00 = + 0
(40)
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where Qnom is the nominal entry heating (J/cm2).  The shoulder radius is usually about 0.1 
of the nose radius and assumes a heating factor for cylindrical geometry.  If the vehicle 
flying side-on is tumbling always side-on, the exposure factor is 1/.  If the vehicle is 
tumbling nose over tail, two places on the shoulder each see the flow about 1/4 of the 
time.  To obtain the general failure criteria for flying side-on, a factor of  is assumed.
2.5.2 Thermal Blanket
The thermal blanket typically consists of an outer layer, e.g. Kapton; multiple 
interior layers, e.g. Mylar and Dacron net; and an inner layer, e.g. Kapton.  The failure 
heating rate is based on the radiation equilibrium for a surface normal to the flow in 
hypersonic, free-molecular flow:
4( )failq EF T1= 0 (41)
Note that this failure criterion is only for the outer layer of the thermal blanket.  However, 
the interior layers are assumed to fail quickly due to their low zero strength temperatures.  
The inner layer also fails quickly as the heat flux continues to increase.  Therefore, the 
qfail calculated above is assumed to be the failure criterion of the thermal blanket.  The 
vehicle’s attitude, e.g. flying forward/backward or tumbling, is modeled by the exposure 
factor. The thermal blanket is expected to fail quickly, and thus radiative cooling is 
assumed negligible.  
2.5.3 Solar Array
The solar array is typically a sandwich consisting of graphite epoxy (GE) 
facesheets (FS) with an interior aluminum honeycomb core.  When the two facesheets 
fail, the honeycomb core loses support and breaks apart.  Therefore, the failure of the 
40
solar array occurs when the 2 facesheets fail.  The total failure integrated heating for the 2 
facesheets depends on the vehicle’s attitude.  If the vehicle is flying forward/backward, 
the facesheet facing the flow has an exposure factor of 1 and needs to fail first before the 
aft facesheet becomes partially exposed to the air flowing through the honeycomb core.  
This partial exposure is modeled by the exposure factor for the aft facesheet and is 
dependent on the density/porosity of the honeycomb core, e.g. typical EF = 1/3 or 1/4.  
Therefore, the total failure integrated heating is:
( )( )fail rad radfront FS aft FS
c d T c d TQ Q Q
HF HF EF
2 2 0 0 0 = + 0 + + 0        (42)
(flying forward/backward)
where d is the thickness of the facesheet.  For a tumbling vehicle, the facesheets are in a 
timeshare for exposure to the flow and will fail at about the same time, instead of 
consecutively as in flying forward/backward.  Therefore, the total failure integrated 
heating is:
( )( )fail rad
c d TQ Q
HF EF
2 00 = + 0 (43)
(tumbling)
2.5.4 Propellant Tanks
A propellant tank typically has a gas side and a liquid fuel side, separated by a 
thin diaphragm.  The gas and liquid are typically helium (He) and hydrazine (N2H4).  
Whether the tank fails first on the gas side or liquid side depends on the vehicle’s 
attitude.  The failure integrated heating of the gas side of the tank is:
( )( )fail radgas side
c d TQ Q
HF EF
2 00 = + 0 (44)
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(gas side)
where d is the thickness of the tank.  Note that for a tumbling vehicle, the g-load is 
assumed to be relatively small and does not distort the diaphragm to a great extent.  
Two scenarios are considered for the failure of the liquid side:  failure due to burst 
pressure and failure due to burnout flux.  These are discussed in the following 
subsections.  Note that the calculation of burnout flux is also given in Ref. [41].
2.5.4.1 Burst Pressure
The vapor pressure of the liquid is:
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1 3 4   exp ln
CC
vapor pressure of liquid C C T C T
T
 = + + +   (45)
where vapor pressure is in Pa, T is temperature in K, and C1 through C5 are liquid-
dependent coefficients obtained from handbooks.  As the gas heats up, the gas pressure 
increases proportionally:
operating
operating
Tgas pressure P
T
 =    
 (46)
where Toperating and Poperating are the operating temperature and pressure.  The Toperating is 
typically assumed to be near room temperature at 293 K, and Poperating is provided.  The 
total pressure in the tank is then:
total pressure vapor pressure of liquid gas pressure= + (47)
The tank burst pressure (Pburst) at room temperature (Troom) is provided.  The tank failure 
pressure for a given temperature is then based on the percentage of room temperature 
tensile yield strength of the tank material ( 1) obtained from handbooks:
(%    )fail room burstP T tensile yield strength P= (48)
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Tank failure occurs when the total pressure exceeds the tank failure pressure:
fail failT T at which total pressure P= > (49)
The heat required to heat the liquid from the operating temperature comes from the heat 
supplied by the airflow and is given in terms of the reference integrated heating:
( )( ) ( ) fail operatingfail liquid rad
liquid side tank flow
T TQ mc mc Q
EF HF A
 0 = + + 0" #???? (50)
where m is mass, and Aflow is the tank surface area normal to the flow, e.g. rtank2 for a 
spherical tank.  
2.5.4.2 Burnout Flux
Another failure scenario is for the liquid propellant tank to burn through once the 
convective heat flux exceeds the burnout flux.  The convective heat flux applied to the 
tank is transferred to the liquid propellant by nucleate boiling [55].  As the external heat 
flux rises and the nucleate boiling limit is exceeded, the liquid can no longer serve as a 
heat sink.  Thus, heating is absorbed by the tank wall, and subsequently tank failure 
occurs.  
The liquid propellant is sufficient to keep the tank cool, until a critical heat flux is 
reached when a vapor volume is formed inside, allowing the tank temperature to increase 
locally to the melt condition.  The burnout flux (qburnout) is calculated by:
1/ 4
7
21 10 124
fg v l v v
burnout fg Earth
v l
h
q g gload
 2 2 2 2 2 2
 = × +  
 (51)
where: hfg = enthalpy of vaporization
2v = density of saturated vapor
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fg = surface tension of liquid-vapor
gEarth = Earth’s gravitational acceleration
gload = perturbing acceleration normalized to gEarth
2l = density of saturated liquid
After exceeding the burnout heat flux, a vapor volume forms inside the tank at the 
stagnation point, and the tank wall is quickly heated to a point where it fails under the 
internal pressure, and the liquid quickly spills out.  Therefore, the tank failure heat flux is: 
( )( )tank  burnoutfail liquid side
qq
HF EF
= (52)
2.6 Sensitivity Analysis
For sensitivity analysis, parametric biases are applied to the variables listed in 
Table 7, with examples of their uncertainties attained from engineering judgment based 
on past experience in vehicle breakup analysis.  The impact footprint is then determined 
from the latitudes and longitudes of the surface impact points as described in Sec. 2.7.
Table 7.  Parametric Biases in Sensitivity Analysis
Parameter Examples of Uncertainties (at t = 0 sec)
Relative flight path angle ± 0.1 deg
Relative speed ± 0.1%
L/D ± 0.03
Mass ± 1%
CD ± 10%
Aref ± 10%
Side Force L/D = 0.03 with bank angle at ± 45 deg
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The sensitivity analysis was performed by using a script file set up with an automated
sequence of runs covering the range of uncertainties listed in Table 7.  It was verified by 
comparing the results obtained by running each dispersed case individually and as part of 
the sensitivity analysis.  The initial condition and vehicle characteristics for the test case 
were:
Altitude = 124.97 km
Relative speed = 10757.36 m/sec
Relative flight path angle = -8.305 deg
Latitude = 44.395 deg
Longitude = 238.104 deg
Azimuth = 121.505 deg
Mass = 205.17 kg
CD = 1.09
Aref = 1.767 m2
The results obtained from the individual runs and from the sensitivity analysis were 
identical, and the dispersed impact points for the test case are given in Table 8.
Table 8.  Impact Points from Sensitivity Analysis
Case Impact Latitude 
(deg)
Impact Longitude 
(deg)
Nominal 40.520 245.784
45 +0.1º 40.451 245.903
45 -0.1º 40.586 245.669
V45 +0.1% 40.518 245.788
V45 -0.1% 40.522 245.780
L/D = 0.03 40.351 246.070
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L/D = -0.03 40.646 245.560
Mass +1% 40.516 245.791
Mass -1% 40.524 245.776
CD +10% 40.562 245.711
CD -10% 40.474 245.864
Aref +10% 40.562 245.711
Aref -10% 40.474 245.864

 = 45º and L/D = 0.03 40.367 245.933

 = -45º and L/D = 0.03 40.451 246.018
Local winds 40.518 245.807
2.7   Footprint Determination
An impact ellipse is determined from surface impact points obtained from a 
parametric/sensitivity analysis or Monte Carlo run.  The set of impact points expressed in 
latitude and longitude is transformed to an x’-y’ coordinate system as shown in Figure 
13:
Figure 13.  Coordinate System for Footprint Determination
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The i-th impact point expressed in (x’, y’) is obtained by: [56]
'
'
cos( )
( )
i i planet
i i planet
x r
y r
 
 
=
=  (53)
where the mean latitude for n samples ( ) is calculated by:
n
 = . (54)
Similarly, the means for the set of x’ coordinates ( 'x ) and y’ coordinates ( 'y ) are 
calculated.  The standard deviation for the set of x’ coordinates (x’) using the nonbiased 
or n-1 method is:
( )22
'
' '
( 1)x
n x x
n n
 = 
. .
 (55)
Similarly, the standard deviation for the set of y’ coordinates is calculated.  The 
correlation coefficient (Ccorr) is calculated by:
( )( )
( ) ( )2 2
' ' ' '
' ' ' '
corr
x x y y
C
x x y y
n
n n
 =
 
.
. .
 (56)
Note that the 2 x 2 covariance matrix is formed by:  [56]
' ' '
' ' '
x corr x y
corr x y y
C
C
  
  
  !" #
.
The 1- semi-major axis is obtained by: [56]
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( ) ( )
22 22 2
2
' '' '
1 ' '2 4
x yx y
corr x ysma C
    += + +  (57)
The 1- semi-minor axis is obtained by: [56]
2 2 2
1 ' ' 1x ysmi sma  = +  (58)
The n- semi-major and semi-minor axes are obtained by:
( )
( )
1
1
n
n
sma n sma
smi n smi
 
 
=
= (59)
Various confidence intervals are given in Table 9.  [56]
Table 9.  Confidence Intervals
n Confidence Interval
0.4590 10 %
1.1774 50 %
2.146 90 %
2.4478 95 %
3.03516 99 %
The angle between the semi-major axis and the x’ axis (7) is: [56]
1
2 2
1
90 tan corr x y
x
C
sma 
 7 
  = °    
(60)
The azimuth is calculated by:  [56]
90 ,      270
,          90
if
else
7  7
 7
> ° = ° '* = ° ,
(61)
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In a coordinate system with the origin at the center of the footprint, the j-th (h, k) 
coordinates of the footprint along the semi-major and semi-minor axes are obtained using 
the equation for an ellipse:
For –sma  hj  sma,
2
2
21
j
j
h
k smi
sma
 = ±    
(62)
The (h, k) coordinates of the footprint are transformed to the (x’, y’) coordinates by: [56]
'
'
cos sin '
sin cos '
jj
jj
hx x
ky y
7 7
7 7
' (' (  ' ( ) ) ) )= +* + * + * + !) ) " # ) ), -, - , -
(63)
The (x’, y’) coordinates of the footprint are transformed back to latitude and longitude 
by:
'
'
cos
j
j
planet
j
j
planet
y
r
x
r
 
 
= +
=
(64)
The impact footprint is calculated automatically at the end of a sensitivity analysis 
using the dispersed impact points obtained.  To verify the calculation of the footprint, the 
dispersed impact points from a sensitivity analysis (Table 8) were imported to another 
software [56] used in conjunction with the AEPL program [31] for the determination of 
footprint.  The footprints obtained were identical and shown in Figure 14.
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Figure 14.  3-Sigma Footprint
2.8 Modeling of Local Winds
To enhance the accuracy of the footprint prediction, the effects of wind are added 
in the trajectory propagation. During an actual launch contingency, the real-time local 
wind profiles obtained from the website of the Air Resources Laboratory of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (ARL of NOAA) [43] would be used in lieu of 
synthetic wind models.  The effects of local winds produce both downrange and 
crossrange variations in the prediction of impact point and are included in the sensitivity 
analysis for the generation of impact footprint.
The vehicle velocity vector expressed in the navigation frame is:
ˆ ˆ ˆ(sin sin cos cos cos )n n n nR R R r R R R Rr v e e e     = + +v&
where: nRr
v&
= relative velocity vector of vehicle in navigation frame
vR = relative speed of vehicle
R = relative flight path angle of vehicle
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R = relative azimuth due north of vehicle
The relative velocity describes the motion of the vehicle with respect to the rotating 
atmosphere and is the same as the aerodynamic velocity in the absence of local winds.  
In a NOAA wind profile, the wind velocity is assumed to be in the local 
horizontal plane, and the flight path angle of the wind is zero (wind = 0º).  Therefore, the 
wind velocity in the navigation frame ( nwindr
v& ) is:
ˆ ˆ(sin cos )n n n nwind wind wind wind windv r v e e  = = +v v& (65)
where vwind is the wind speed. The wind velocity projected onto the spacecraft velocity 
frame ( vwindv
v ) is:
v v n
wind n windv C v=v v (66)
The spacecraft relative velocity in the velocity frame ( vRr
v& ) is:
ˆ
v v
R R xr v e=v& (67)
Thus, the aerodynamic velocity ( vaerov
v ) is:
v v v
aero R windv r v= +v v v& (68)
The aerodynamic speed is then:
v
aero aerov v= v (69)
Note that there exists an aerodynamic velocity frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,a a ax y ze e e ) such that:
ˆ
a a
aero aero xv v e=v
The aerodynamic velocity vector is illustrated in Figure 15.
51
Figure 15.  Relative, Wind, and Aerodynamic Velocity Vectors
The aerodynamic velocity vector in the body frame is obtained by:
, , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ
b b v b b b b b b
aero v aero aero x x aero y y aero z zv C v v e v e v e= = + +v v (70)
where 
,
b
aero xv , ,
b
aero yv , and ,
b
aero zv  are the three components of the aerodynamic velocity 
in the body frame.  The angle-of-attack of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic 
velocity (a) is:
,1
,
tan
b
aero z
a b
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The sideslip angle of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic velocity (	a) is:
,1sin
b
aero y
a
aero
v
v
	 = (72)
The bank angle of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic velocity (
a) is:
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The Mach number based on aerodynamic velocity is:
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where vsound is the speed of sound.  The aerodynamic lift (L) and drag (D) forces are then 
calculated based on vaero, Ma, a, 	a, and 
a.  For example,
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where 2$ is the freestream atmospheric density and Aref is the reference area.
The modeling of local winds would be the most effective in application to a 6-
DOF trajectory simulation.  However, the initial implementation of the modeling of local 
winds was done in a 3-DOF trajectory simulation for translational motion of the 
spacecraft.  A test case was not available to verify the modeling of local winds.  A 
simulation run was made for the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) case study and is 
presented later in Section 3.5.
3. Results of New Dynamics Modeling and Capabilities
A case study is discussed in this section using the Mars Exploration Rover 
Mission to demonstrate the improvements made to vehicle breakup analysis for 
applications in aerospace nuclear safety as a result of the new dynamics modeling and 
capabilities developed for the upgraded analysis tool.  Comparison with results from the 
legacy software is given wherever applicable.
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3.1 Case Study:  Mars Exploration Rover Mission
NASA’s twin robot geologists, MER-A and MER-B, were launched on June 10 
and July 7, 2003, respectively, in search of answers about the history of waters on Mars. 
The two rovers were delivered in landing craft to separate sites on Mars in January 2004.  
MER-A was launched using a Delta II 7925 launch vehicle, and since MER-B 
required more energy to get to Mars, a Delta II 7925 H was used. After the boost stage 
(Stage I), two more stages were used to inject the spacecraft into a trajectory to Mars.  
Stage II fired twice, once to insert the vehicle-spacecraft stack into a low Earth orbit, and 
then again to provide the required proper Mars alignment and velocity for the third stage 
and MER. The purpose of Stage III/Star 48 was to provide the majority of the velocity 
change needed to leave Earth and then inject the spacecraft into a trajectory for Mars. 
Embedded within the rovers were LWRHUs containing plutonium dioxide fuel to 
provide heat by radioactive decay [57].  In the unlikely event of a mission failure during 
launch before the spacecraft began the interplanetary cruise to Mars, atmospheric reentry 
of the spacecraft was possible.  Therefore, contingency plans were required for rapid 
response with the ultimate goal of retrieving the LWRHU modules for environmental 
protection.  To achieve this objective, knowledge of the LWRHU impact footprint was 
required.  The footprint was generated by trajectory propagations with the simulation of 
vehicle breakup based on thermal and structural analyses, performed within a range of 
uncertainties.  
Pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis and footprint predictions were performed to 
facilitate and expedite response in case of a contingency during launch.  The objectives of 
the pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis included: (1) Determine whether the LWRHU 
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modules were released from the spacecraft during an accidental atmospheric reentry and 
(2) predict the impact footprint of the LWRHUs or the component containing the 
LWRHUs.  A wide scope of possible reentry scenarios was investigated including 
suborbital reentries resulting from failure during the ascent and out-of-orbit reentries 
resulting from failure while in the parking orbit.
Information on the spacecraft, launch vehicle, thermal nodes, exposure factors, 
failure criteria, etc, required to perform vehicle breakup analysis are given in Appendix 
G.
3.2 Predictions of Impact Points in Suborbital Reentries
Suborbital reentries were analyzed for the following FTS activation times:
1. Low speed (ocean impact):  100, 150, 220.8, 261, 293, 400, 450, 500, 550, and 
560 sec
2. High speed (land impact):  571.073 sec
The vehicle state vectors at the times of FTS activation obtained from the ascent 
trajectories [58] were used as the initial conditions of the spacecraft ballistic trajectories.  
In the ten cases analyzed for low speed suborbital reentry, the detonation of the 
launch vehicle during ascent would release the spacecraft into a ballistic trajectory.  For 
FTS activation times of 220.8 sec and earlier, the spacecraft did not reach an altitude 
above the atmosphere before beginning its descent trajectory.  In these cases, heating 
during the ascent portion of the trajectories were also considered in the integration of 
heating rate.  For FTS activation times of 261 sec and greater, the spacecraft had enough 
energy to temporarily exit the atmosphere during which the ascent heating was assumed 
to have dissipated, and thus only heating during the post-reentry descent were considered 
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in the integration of heating rate.  Figure 16 shows the integrated heating versus FTS 
activation time where (1) ascent heating was considered without breakup analysis, (2) 
only descent heating was considered without breakup analysis, and (3) only descent 
heating was considered with breakup analysis (with restarts).
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Figure 16.  Integrated Heating vs Time of FTS Activation in Suborbital Reentries
For the suborbital reentry resulting from an FTS activation time of 571.073 sec, 
the altitude with the sequence of node failures, air-relative speed, and ground track of the 
spacecraft obtained using the upgraded analysis tool are given in Figure 17.  All the 
nodes failed, and the LWRHU modules were released.  The ground impact point of the 
LWRHU modules was at latitude of -17.39º and longitude of 30.24º, or the northern part 
of Zimbabwe, Africa.  The results of the suborbital reentries at the other FTS activation 
times are provided in Ref. [65]. 
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Figure 17.  (a) Vehicle Altitude with Sequence of Node Failures, (b) Air-Relative 
Speed, and (c) Ground Track at FTS Activation of 571.073 sec
An independent vehicle breakup analysis using the legacy software was 
performed by Dr. Angus McRonald for MER-A suborbital reentry at FTS activation time 
of 570.8 sec.  The initial condition was based on an older version of the ascent trajectory.  
The same thermal nodes and failure criteria were adopted in the vehicle breakup analyses 
performed using the legacy software and the upgraded analysis tool.  The sequence of 
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failures plotted on the altitude time history obtained using the legacy software is given in 
Figure 18.
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Figure 18.  Independent Vehicle Breakup Analysis Using Legacy Software
The failure times and LWRHU release time produced from the legacy software and the 
upgraded analysis tool were in close agreement.  The differences were due to small 
differences in the initial conditions based on slightly different ascent trajectories, slightly 
different FTS activation times, and the software programs.  The legacy software did not 
predict impact point, thus comparisons of impact points from the legacy software and the 
upgraded analysis tool could not be made.
3.3 Prediction of Impact Points in Out-of-Orbit Reentries
In the vehicle breakup analysis of out-of-orbit entry, the entry conditions and the 
probabilities of the various types of reentry were obtained from the V-Gamma Map.  
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Specific cases of out-of-orbit entry were then selected for detailed analysis.  In particular, 
two cases of COD, one delayed elliptic, and one powered entry were analyzed.
The V-Gamma map in the legacy software system provided only entry speed and 
flight path angle.  Thus, the impact point cannot be predicted, and only range relative to 
the arbitrary entry point can be estimated.
3.3.1 V-Gamma Map
In the vehicle breakup analysis, the V-Gamma Map was used as a pre-processor 
to provide the initial speed and flight path angle for accidental out-of-orbit reentries, and 
points about the V-Gamma Map were considered in order to bound the possible reentry 
scenarios.  The V-Gamma Map plots for MER-A and MER-B were similar, thus only 
MER-A plots for the launch day considered in this analysis are presented.  The possible 
entry speeds and flight path angles for the various classes of reentry trajectories are given 
in the V-Gamma Map as shown in Figure 19(a).  The relative probabilities of the 
different classes of trajectories are given in the pie graph as shown in Figure 19(b).  The 
departure plane map for the various classes of trajectories as functions of cone and clock 
angles is given in Ref. [65]. 
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(a) (b)
Figure 19:  (a) V-Gamma Map for the MER-A Mission, (b) Relative Probabilities 
for the MER-A Mission
3.3.2 Circular Orbit Decay
In COD, the time and point of atmospheric reentry would not be accurately 
predictable until the entry neared.  The entry window based on tracking data would then 
be provided by the Air Force Space Command.  For analysis purposes, arbitrary entry 
points were used for COD.  Thus, only ranges, not impact points, were predicted.  The 
initial condition is listed below:
Altitude = 125 km
vI = 7803 m/sec (vR = 7385.5 m/sec)
I = -0.2º (R = -0.2113º)
Latitude = 28.3º
Longitude = 0º
Azimuth = 90º
The entry vehicle consisted of the Aeroshell and Cruise Stage. Entry angles-of-attack of 
0º and 90º were analyzed.  In both cases, all the nodes failed, and the LWRHU modules 
o ELD
+   ELP
* PWE
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were released.  For EI = 0º, the range from entry to surface impact was 6838 km, and 
7292 km for EI = 90º.  Thus, a difference of 450 km in range was observed between the 
two entry orientations.
3.3.3 Delayed Elliptic
A case of delayed elliptic entry was selected at cone and clock angles of 140º and 
60º.  The initial condition was obtained by propagating with cone and clock angles of 
140º and 60º:
Altitude = 122.68 km
vI = 4945.94 m/sec (vR = 4605.9 m/sec)
I = -16.84º (R = -18.13º)
Latitude = -25.89º
Longitude = 39.74º
Azimuth = 124.79º
For this case, atmospheric entry occurred at 677.12 sec from the beginning of the Stage II 
restart burn, or 84 sec after the jettison of Stage III.  The entry angle-of-attack was 
154.36º and assumed to be 180º for simplicity.  The entry vehicle consisted of the 
Aeroshell and Cruise Stage.  
The entry flight path angle of –16.84º was relatively steep.  Thus, a g-load failure 
criterion of 30 gees with no heating was also evaluated.  The maximum g-load for this
reentry was 22.72 gees, and vehicle breakup due to g-load was not assumed.  All the CS 
nodes except for Nodes 9 and 11 failed.  The Aeroshell remained intact.  The ocean 
impact point of the Aeroshell with CS Nodes 9 and 11 still attached was at latitude of -
27.24º and longitude of 41.98º, off the east coast of Africa.
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3.3.4 Powered Reentry
A case of powered entry was selected at cone and clock angles of 90º and -15º.  
The initial condition was obtained by propagating with cone and clock angles of 90º and -
15º:
Altitude = 124.998 km
vI = 7916.26 m/sec (vR = 7532.27 m/sec)
I = -1.78º (R = -1.87º)
Latitude = -16.54º
Longitude = 25.25º
Azimuth = 123.23º
For this case, atmospheric entry occurred at 221.44 sec from the beginning of the Stage II 
restart burn.  The nominal post-entry burn time of Stage III was 83.819 sec, and the 
nominal time to jettison Stage III post-entry was 371.679 sec.  The entry angle-of-attack 
was 78.66º and assumed to be 90º for simplicity.  The entry vehicle consisted of the 
Aeroshell, Cruise Stage, LVA2, and Stage III.  The entry mass corresponding to the entry 
time was 3234.26 kg.
All the nodes failed, and the LWRHU modules were released.  The ground impact 
point of the LWRHU modules was at latitude of -21.62º and longitude of 34.40º, or east 
coast of Mozambique, Africa.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Footprint Calculation
To generate a footprint, the parametric biases given in Table 7 were applied to the 
nominal run.  To obtain the impact footprint, the array of latitudes and longitudes at 
surface impact from the parametric analysis without simulations of vehicle breakup was 
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processed.  The following initial condition and vehicle characteristics were used to 
generate the footprint:
Radius = 6543489.0 m
Longitude = 297.71 deg
Latitude = 24.39 deg
Relative speed = 6751.99 m/s
Azimuth = 106.68 deg
Relative flight path angle = 0.424 deg
Mass = 1913.93 kg
Aref = 3.92 m2
CD = 1.25
The 3-sigma (3-) impact ellipse is shown in Figure 20 and had the following 
dimensions:
Semi-major axis = 76.14 km
Semi-minor axis = 5.23 km
Azimuth = 117.2 deg
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Figure 20.  3- Impact Footprint
The legacy software does not predict impact footprint, thus comparisons between the 
legacy software and the upgraded analysis tool were not made.
3.5 Prediction of Impact Footprint with Effects of Winds
An example wind profile downloaded from the NOAA website is given in Table 
10.
Table 10.  Example Wind Profile from NOAA Website
PRES     TMPC     DWPC     HGHT     DRCT     SPED 
 1009.00    14.40    12.30    93.00   180.00      .50 
 1000.00    15.40    12.40   163.00   200.00     2.10 
 983.45    16.18    12.01   305.00   260.00     6.70 
 958.00    17.40    11.40   528.05   270.97     7.07 
 948.81    16.68    11.46   610.00   275.00     7.20 
 925.00    14.80    11.60   826.00   285.00     6.70 
 915.40    14.38    11.53   914.00   290.00     6.70 
 882.88    12.93    11.27  1219.00   300.00     4.10 
 850.00    11.40    11.00  1539.00   310.00     3.10 
 820.89    10.00     9.68  1829.00   305.00     2.10 
 791.35     8.53     8.29  2134.00   280.00     2.60 
 777.00     7.80     7.60  2286.23   275.03     3.10 
 762.74     6.95     6.77  2438.00   270.00     3.60 
 734.85     5.23     5.09  2743.00   260.00     4.60 
 707.99     3.52     3.41  3048.00   245.00     6.20 
64
700.00     3.00     2.90  3141.00   245.00     6.20 
 655.51     -.03     -.26  3658.00   245.00     7.70 
 630.68    -1.80    -2.12  3962.00   250.00     7.20 
 606.71    -3.59    -3.99  4267.00   255.00     6.70 
 561.48    -7.16    -7.72  4877.00   280.00    10.30 
 540.14    -8.94    -9.58  5182.00   290.00    10.30 
 500.00   -12.50   -13.30  5790.00   285.00     8.80 
 480.16   -14.27   -15.52  6096.00   280.00     7.20 
 444.00   -17.70   -19.80  6687.96   255.76     7.68 
 442.92   -17.83   -19.94  6706.00   255.00     7.70 
 400.00   -23.30   -25.60  7460.00   265.00    10.30 
 391.16   -24.53   -26.90  7620.00   270.00    11.80 
 324.00   -34.90   -37.90  8968.08   274.40    15.94 
 315.86   -36.55   -39.49  9144.00   275.00    16.50 
 300.00   -39.90   -42.70  9500.00   280.00    17.50 
 251.95   -50.05   -53.61 10668.00   280.00    23.70 
 250.00   -50.50   -54.10 10720.00   280.00    24.20 
 201.00   -61.65   -64.85 12098.48   285.00    32.40 
 200.00   -61.90   -65.10 12130.00   285.00    32.40 
 198.00   -62.43   -65.63 12192.00   285.00    32.40 
 197.00   -62.70   -65.90 12223.33   285.00    31.40 
 170.96   -60.51   -64.65 13106.00   270.00    20.10 
 155.00   -59.00   -63.79 13716.00   300.00    22.10 
 150.00   -58.50   -63.50 13920.00   300.00    20.10 
 140.51   -60.72   -66.08 14326.00   300.00    12.90 
 125.00   -64.70   -70.70 15052.22   296.04    13.69 
 121.24   -64.10   -70.10 15240.00   295.00    13.90 
 114.00   -62.90   -68.90 15618.30   293.40    12.59 
 107.00   -65.50   -71.50 16006.99   291.76    11.24 
 100.00   -64.90   -70.90 16420.00   290.00     9.80 
 
where: PRES = pressure (millibar)
TMPC = temperature (ºC)
DWPC = dew point temperature (ºC)
HGHT = altitude (m)
DRCT = direction of wind where 0º is due North (deg)
SPED = wind speed (knots)
Trajectory propagations were performed with the following initial condition and vehicle 
characteristics, with and without the effects of the wind profile:
Radius = 6503138.0 m
Longitude = 25.25 deg
Latitude = -16.54 deg
Relative speed = 7532.27 m/sec
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Azimuth = 123.23 deg
Relative flight path angle = -1.87 deg
Mass = 3234.26 kg
Aref = 3.92 m2
CD = 1.25
A difference of approximately 100 meters in range was observed between the simulations 
with and without the example wind profile, both without the simulation of vehicle 
breakup.  The legacy software does not have the modeling of local winds, thus 
comparisons between the legacy software and the upgraded analysis tool were not made.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
Vehicle breakup analysis for applications in aerospace nuclear safety had been 
performed for decades using a legacy software which provided functions for trajectory 
propagation coupled with thermal and structural analyses and influences.  New dynamics 
modeling and capabilities for the analysis tool have been developed with the objectives to 
(1) have the capability to predict impact point and footprint, (2) increase the fidelity in 
the prediction of vehicle breakup, and (3) reduce the effort and time required to complete 
an analysis.  The derivation and verification of these new functions were presented in this 
dissertation, which included the following:
• Functions to provide the capability to predict impact point and footprint:
- 3-DOF trajectory propagation for spacecraft translational motion
- Sensitivity analysis
- Impact footprint calculation
- V-Gamma map with non-arbitrary entry points
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• Functions to increase the fidelity in the prediction of vehicle breakup:
- Panel code for the calculation of hypersonic aerodynamic coefficients for 
an arbitrary-shaped body
- Modeling of local winds
• Function to reduce the effort and time required to complete an analysis:
- Node failure criteria calculations
A case study using the Mars Exploration Rover mission was given to demonstrate 
an improved and more complete vehicle breakup analysis provided by the upgraded 
analysis tool, and comparisons with results obtained using the legacy software were given 
wherever applicable. Detailed discussions on the various applications of vehicle breakup 
analysis, the process of performing vehicle breakup analysis with engineering judgment 
for contingency planning and launch approval, and some standard derivations of 
coordinate transformation matrices and 3-DOF equations of motion were given in the
appendices.
Future work to further improve the fidelity and facilitate the performance of 
vehicle breakup analysis includes:
1. Implement Monte Carlo analysis to improve the modeling of uncertainties
2. Incorporate temperature dependence in material properties, e.g. emissivity
3. Automate loading of properties for common materials from database, e.g. 
aluminum, titanium, stainless steel, copper, graphite epoxy, etc.
4. Improve modeling for thermal analysis
5. Improve modeling for structural analysis
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6. Utilize computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to take “snapshots” of the flow field 
to determine heating and exposure factors for various flight conditions
7. Implement or utilize method(s) to determine aerodynamic coefficients of vehicle 
in flight regimes below hypersonic
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Appendix A.  Vehicle Breakup Analysis for Aerospace Nuclear Safety
There have been three U.S. and four known USSR/Russian inadvertent reentries 
of nuclear powered spacecraft in the history of the space programs, thus demonstrating 
the need to perform pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis for risk assessment and 
contingency planning.  As seen in Table 11 [1], unrecoverable vehicle malfunction 
leading to reentry can occur during launch prior to Earth escape, and there were cases that 
resulted in the release of radioactive fuel.  In the first U.S. inadvertent reentry in 1964, 
the RTG was designed to burn up and disperse its nuclear fuel in the upper atmosphere 
during accidental reentry, and it performed as planned.  Subsequently, the RTGs had been 
designed for full fuel containment, and as seen in the next 2 accidental reentries, the 
objective was achieved.
Table 11.  Inadvertent Earth Reentries of Nuclear Powered Payloads
Mission Date Failure Result Nuclear 
Contamination
Transit 5BN-3 
(US for 
navigation)
Apr 12, 
1964
Failure to achieve 
orbit. Launched by 
Thorad-DSV2A 
Able-Star rockets
SNAP-3 RTG burned 
up during reentry
1800 curies of Pu-
238 released in 
upper atmosphere 
[1, p. 57]
Nimbus B (US 
for 
meteorology)
May 
18, 
1968
Thorad-SLV2G 
Agena-D launch 
vehicle failure. 
Activation of flight 
destruct system
RTG recovered 
intact.  Its nuclear 
fuel later used on 
Nimbus 3.
Radioactivity not 
released
LEM 7 (US 
manned lunar 
lander of 
Apollo 13)
Apr 17, 
1970
Lunar landing 
aborted.  Apollo 13 
spacecraft returned 
to Earth
RTG undamaged, but 
lost, during Earth 
reentry of jettisoned 
lunar module
No radioactivity 
measured
Kosmos 556 
(USSR for 
surveillance)
1973 Failure to reach orbit Reactor burned up 
during reentry
*Radioactivity 
measured
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Kosmos 954 
(USSR for 
surveillance)
1978 Failure to boost 
reactor into safe 
orbit
Reactor burned up 
over Canada during 
reentry.
*Radioactivity 
polluted 124,000 
km2 ground area
Kosmos 1402 
(USSR for 
surveillance)
Jan 23, 
1983
Failure to boost 
reactor into safe 
orbit
Reactor core burned 
up over south 
Atlantic during 
reentry.
*Radioactivity 
released
Mars 8 
(Russian Mars 
96 mission)
Nov 17, 
1996
Failure to insert into 
Mars cruise 
trajectory
Reentered. Crashed 
within presumed area 
covering Pacific 
Ocean, Chile, Bolivia
Outcome of RTG 
unknown
* Amount of release not known to author
Mission-ending failures prior to Earth escape are typically due to a malfunction of
the launch vehicle.  (Spacecraft failures are also considered, but do not contribute 
significantly to the overall launch-phase failure probability.)  Guidance failures, 
insufficient thrust, failure to ignite a motor, inadvertent payload fairing (PLF) separation, 
failure to separate the PLF, and explosions of solid or liquid propellant motors are typical 
contributors.  For example, of the 311 launches in the Delta family from 1960 to 2004, 16 
were failures or partial failures [38].  The last failure occurred in 1999.  On the basis that 
launch vehicles are not 100% reliable and inadvertent reentries of nuclear power systems 
have occurred with the release of radioactive material, the necessity of considering 
inadvertent reentry events as possible contributors to the nuclear risk assessment of these 
types of space missions is thus well demonstrated.  Hence, NASA works to pro-actively 
assess risks associated with launch and to address all off-nominal reentry scenarios in a 
lengthy process throughout a mission’s life span.
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Appendix B.  Vehicle Breakup Analysis for Planetary Protection
Aside from aerospace nuclear safety, another application of vehicle breakup 
analysis is in the planetary protection of the destination planet in a planetary exploration 
mission, e.g. a mission to Mars.  Past track record where two-thirds of all international 
missions to Mars have failed [67] demonstrates the challenge in landing a spacecraft 
successfully on Mars.  Examples are given in Table 12 of missions which made it far 
enough to begin EDL, but failed during EDL.  Although none of these failed missions 
used nuclear power system, they serve to illustrate the possibility of planetary 
contamination if appropriate categorization were not specified and enforced for missions 
with nuclear-powered payloads.
Table 12.  Missions with Unsuccessful Mars EDL
Mission Date Failure
Mars 2 (USSR) Nov 27, 1971 Crash landed due to failure of braking 
rockets [68]
Mars 6 (USSR) Mar 12, 1974 Lander failure during EDL [68]
Mars Polar Lander (US) Dec 3, 1999 Lost spacecraft during EDL [69]
Beagle 2 (UK) Dec 19, 2003 Lost communication with lander [70]
Scientists have discovered Earth microorganisms that are unusually resistant to radiation 
and desiccation, which would have a decent chance of surviving the interplanetary cruise 
and to live on the surface of, for example, Mars [71].  Microbes have been found to exist 
in inhospitable conditions on Earth such as in the Antarctic, miles underground in hot 
geysers, and in the decontaminated Spacecraft Assembly Facility at JPL, which serves as 
a portal for the microbes to travel to other planets.  In harsh environments, certain 
microbes have been discovered to draw their nourishment from sulfur, manganese, iron, 
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petroleum, and even appeared to thrive on aluminum and titanium.  Microbes are 
constantly evolving and adapting to the surrounding conditions.  In the case of an 
unsuccessful entry, descent, and landing (EDL) upon arrival at the destination planet, 
favorable impact condition in icy regions by an isotopic system may create a liquid-water 
environment suitable for Earth microorganisms to thrive with the nuclear component as 
the perennial heat source.  Hence, the difficulty in performing EDL at the destination 
planet and the survivability of microbes in harsh environment make it essential to 
perform vehicle breakup analysis at JPL for the predictions of impact points and 
conditions for various EDL failure scenarios.  Dependent on the potential contamination 
as determined by vehicle breakup and impact analyses, NASA then specifies the proper 
categorization of the mission, to impose an appropriate level of requirements on the 
spacecraft’s organic cleanliness and heat sources for planetary protection.
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Appendix C.  Vehicle Breakup Analysis for Debris Analysis
C.1 History of Reentries
Of the growing number of man-made hardware orbiting Earth (see Figure 21
[42]), approximately 100 to 200 large objects reenter the Earth atmosphere each year 
[72].  An atmospheric reentry may be uncontrolled or controlled.  An uncontrolled 
reentry can occur due to orbit decay.  If the spacecraft debris survives to reach the Earth 
surface, the location of the debris footprint is usually random, but may be predictable.  
For spacecraft of enormous mass, a controlled reentry is necessitated to target the debris 
footprint towards an uninhabited region, usually located in the ocean, to minimize hazard 
to humans, properties, and the environment.  An uncontrolled reentry can also be due to
an unsuccessful launch, e.g. the Shuttle Challenger accident, resulting in the fallback of 
debris, or a controlled Earth-return reentry that went awry, e.g. the Genesis sample-return 
mission or the Shuttle Columbia accident. 
(Note the high concentration in low Earth orbit and larger population in northern 
hemisphere.  Approximately 95% are debris, e.g. not functional satellites)
Figure 21.  Geosynchronous View of Object Population
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The majority of the Earth reentries are uncontrolled reentries of rocket bodies, typically 
launch vehicle upper stage engines and motors (see Figure 22 [42]).  Uncontrolled 
reentries often draw public concern due to the possible associated hazard placed on 
humans, properties, and the environment.  For example, Salyut 7, a Soviet space station 
with a mass of 40,000 kg, impacted the Andes Mountains in an uncontrolled reentry on 
February 7, 1991 [73].  In 1978, a Soviet defense satellite went out of control, and its 
inadvertent reentry left radioactive debris in the Canadian Arctic [73].  Fortunately, there 
was no report of injury in both cases.
(a) (b)
Figure 22.  (a) Delta 2 Second Stage Stainless Steel Propellant Tank Landed in 
Georgetown, TX, (b) Delta 2 Third Stage Titanium Motor Casing Landed in Saudi 
Arabia
Examples of relatively recent reentries of satellites are given in Table 13 [72].
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Table 13.  Past Reentries of Satellites
Satellite Nationality Date of Reentry
Raduga Soviet May 6, 2004
FWS China Dec 18, 2003
Osumi Japan Aug 1, 2003
Oko constellation Soviet Feb 28, 2002
Feb 4, 2003
OV1 US Nov 30, 2002
Yantar Russia Sep 23, 2002
TUBSAT-N Germany Apr 22, 2002
Hete US Apr 7, 2002
SIMPLESAT US Jan 30, 2002
SROSS C2 India Jul 12, 2001
ASCA Japan Mar 2, 2001
Perhaps the most well-known controlled reentry is that of the Russian Mir Space 
Station.   With a docked Progress M1-5 spacecraft, the total mass of 143,000 kg reentered 
the Earth atmosphere on Mar 23, 2001 [73].  The 6000 x 500 km footprint was aimed in 
the South Pacific Ocean between New Zealand and Chile, with a nominal impact point at 
47º south latitude and 140º west longitude.  Three deorbit burns were performed for the 
controlled reentry.  The first 2 burns were nominal, but the final braking maneuver was 
an overburn, resulting in a reentry earlier than planned.  During the reentry, the station’s 
solar batteries, antennas, and insulation broke away at below 90 km in altitude.  The 
modules became separated 2 minutes later at approximately 74.1 km.  Sightings of 5 
pieces of the station which were the modules streaking through the sky followed by sonic 
boom were reported by observers in Fiji island.  The actual debris footprint was shifted, 
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covering just south of Fiji to the upper left corner of the planned impact footprint.  There 
was no report of injury.
Another notable reentry of an enormous spacecraft is the July 11, 1979 reentry of 
the Skylab space station, with a mass of 69,000 kg [74].  Just before reentry, Skylab was 
set to tumble end-over-end to reduce the drag to a known level, which made prediction of 
the impact footprint possible.  In the actual reentry, Skylab started to break up later than 
predicted, shifting the 7400 x 185 km debris footprint to the east by hundreds of 
kilometers.  Debris scattered mostly over the Indian Ocean.  The sparsely settled ranch 
country southeast of Perth in western Australia was showered with pieces of debris, and 
residents reported hearing sonic booms and whirring noises.  However, there was no 
report of injury or property damage.  It was determined later that the error in the breakup 
prediction was caused by a miscalculation of drag during tumbling by 4%.
C.2 Debris Analysis in the Global Scene
The European Conference on Space Debris was started by the International 
Academy of Astronautics (IAA) to specifically address the debris and vehicle breakup 
issues.  Numerous organizations worldwide are devoted to monitoring space debris and 
performing reentry analysis.  Selected examples of organizations are provided below.
• The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office is based in Houston, TX at the 
Johnson Space Center, and is the lead NASA center for orbital debris research 
[42].  Its charter is “to conduct measurements of the environment and to develop 
the technical consensus for adopting mitigation measures to protect users of the 
orbital environment”.  Two software tools are used to analyze the reentry 
survivability of spacecraft components.  The Debris Assessment Software (DAS) 
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is a conservative, lower-fidelity software, and the Object Reentry Survival 
Analysis Tool (ORSAT) program is a more accurate, higher-fidelity software.
• The Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies (CORDS) at the Aerospace 
Corporation was established “to recognize the increasing significance of orbital 
debris and reentry hazards to space missions” [72].  The company collected over 
30 – 40 years of reentry data and developed accurate models and simulation tools 
for reentry analysis.
• The European Space Operations Centre (ESOC) of the European Space Agency 
(ESA) in Darmstadt, Germany, uses the DISCOS database to track all space 
debris [75].
• The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is conducting research on 
solutions to the problem of space debris and to enhance the durability of 
components to endure the severe environment of outer space [76]. 
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Appendix D.  Vehicle Breakup Analysis with Engineering Judgment
For reference, the process of performing vehicle breakup analysis and the 
engineering judgment involved are described in the steps listed below.
D.1 Determine Failure Scenarios from Mission Timeline and Launch Trajectory
The mission timeline specifies major events that occur prior to Earth escape.  The 
launch vehicles commonly used for space exploration include the Delta family and Atlas 
family.  The launch vehicles typically consist of multiple stages, and the major events 
specified in the timeline include the start and cut-off of burns, jettison of components, 
spin-up, etc.  The launch vehicle’s onboard computer has contingency procedures for 
various failures, but for an unrecoverable vehicle malfunction during ascent, the launch 
vehicle also has multiple destruct systems to terminate the flight.  Each flight termination 
system (FTS) may have a different method of trigger and operating window.  The post-
FTS spacecraft configuration may depend on which FTS was activated as well as the time 
of activation.  Note that an unrecoverable vehicle malfunction may not be observable or 
detected until all the destruct systems have been disabled late in the ascent, resulting in 
no FTS.   An unrecoverable vehicle malfunction can lead to a fallback trajectory due to 
insufficient energy for the vehicle to be captured into orbit, e.g. suborbital reentry, or a 
reentry from failure to achieve escape velocity for insertion into interplanetary cruise, e.g. 
out-of-orbit reentry.  
In a launch from Cape Canaveral due east, a majority of ballistic fallbacks prior to 
parking orbit insertion would lead to impact in the Atlantic Ocean.  Only a small subset 
occurring near the end of the ascent would lead to impact on Africa or even the Indian 
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Ocean.  The cases leading to impact in Africa are of particular interest for the obvious 
reason of public safety concerns.  During the last few seconds at the end of the ascent 
before engine cut-off, the vehicle achieves orbital energy, and thereafter the destruct 
systems are disabled and accidental reentry would be out-of-orbit.
For the analysis of out-of-orbit reentries, a spectrum of reentry conditions can be 
derived from the assumptions of (1) steady misaligned burns, or SMB, where the thrust 
misalignment is defined by the cone and clock angles, and (2) an otherwise nominal, 
time-delayed sequence of burns while in parking orbit.  The cone angle is measured in the 
yaw plane with 0º as the nominal burn, and the clock angle is about the roll axis such that 
a yaw of 90º and roll of 90º would yield a vertically upward thrust.  The burn sequence is 
specified by the initial conditions of the parking orbit, the engine specific impulse (Isp) of 
each burn, the durations of the burn and coast sequences, and the mass of the spacecraft 
before and after each burn/coast sequence. Depending on the misdirected burn, the 
spacecraft would be propelled into a specific orbit, with atmo spheric reentry as a possible 
outcome of the SMB.  This failure scenario may not be highly probable, but it provides 
an envelope which encompasses everywhere that the vehicle can get to, given the 
onboard fuel.  The possible outcomes of the SMB fall into the following categories [39]:
1. Hyperbolic escape (HE):  For this subset of SMB, the spacecraft has reached 
hyperbolic speed and achieved an interplanetary trajectory, and thus is not on a 
path that reenters the atmosphere.  HE includes the desired special case of being 
on the correct interplanetary trajectory as well as being on off-nominal 
interplanetary trajectories.  About 5% - 30% of SMB maps to a hyperbolic escape.
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2. Orbit decay reentry (DEL): For this subset of SMB, the perigee of the final orbit 
is above the atmosphere, so that reentry occurs after a period of orbit decay.  Less 
than 10% of SMB maps to an orbit decay reentry.
3. Powered reentry (PWE):  For this subset of SMB, the reentry occurs while the 
burns are in progress, and the spacecraft has not separated from the launch 
vehicle.  About 40% - 50% of SMB maps to a powered reentry .
4. Prompt reentry (ELP):  For this subset of SMB, the burns have finished prior to 
reentry but the vehicle is then on a downward path approaching a perigee within 
the atmosphere.  Less than 10% of SMB maps to a prompt reentry.
5. Delayed reentry (ELD):  For this subset of SMB, the vehicle is on an upward path 
at the end of the burns and will reenter the atmosphere after passing though an 
apogee.  About 40% - 50% of SMB maps to a delayed reentry.
6. Prompt hyperbolic reentry (HP):  For this subset of SMB, the vehicle has an 
escape speed but will reenter the atmosphere and may exit and fall into the HE or 
ELD categories.  Less than 1% of SMB maps to a prompt hyperbolic reentry.
7. Circular Orbit Decay (COD):  The spiral case of COD is due to failed burns from 
parking orbit.  Reentry may occur one or two weeks later.  With a shallow reentry 
angle, there may be multiple skip-outs before the spacecraft is captured into 
atmospheric reentry, and the COD reentry is after the skip-outs are all done.  The 
reentry is similar to DEL. The COD is a single point at near circular orbit speed 
with near zero flight path angle.  
The pairs of reentry speed (V) and flight path angle (Gamma) are plotted to 
generate the V-Gamma map.  Note that the hyperbolic escape and orbit decay reentry 
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categories will not appear on this map.  In the orbit decay reentry category, typically the 
initial elliptical orbit will eventually decay into a circular orbit, and then continues as a 
COD which is represented by a single point on the V-Gamma map.  The COD reentry is a 
monotonic case where the speed is the circular orbit speed less 10 or 20 m/s and the 
gamma is slightly less than 0, e.g. -0.3º.  However, in the case of a highly elliptical orbit, 
reentry near perigee may occur prior to achieving circular orbit due to orbit decay.  In a 
COD or elliptical orbit decay, the entry point and time of entry are arbitrary, thus only 
impact point relative to the assumed entry point can be predicted.  The relative 
probabilities for the categories of SMB outcome are illustrated on a pie graph.  A mission 
to explore an outer planet which requires higher launch energy will display a higher 
percentage for the hyperbolic escape in its pie graph compared to that of a mission to 
explore an inner planet.
Note that the points within the V-Gamma map are not restricted to the SMB 
failure scenario; for example, the outcomes of partial burns and no burn are also points 
within the V-Gamma map.  Therefore, a given V-Gamma pair within the map may 
correspond to multiple failure scenarios, and thus the entry point is not unique.  However, 
the points about the V-Gamma map (on the boundary of the V-Gamma map) are 
restricted to the SMB failure scenario.  For each point about the V-Gamma map, a non-
arbitrary entry condition can be determined and associated with it is a specific impact 
point which can be predicted through trajectory propagation with breakup analysis.  
The accident initial conditions (AIC) that are contributors to various accident 
outcome conditions (AOC) are provided.  For example, an attitude control malfunction 
may be a contributor which occurs during the ascent as the AIC, and the resulting AOC 
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may be the activation of the Command Destruct System (CDS) and a suborbital reentry 
of the spacecraft released from the destructed launch vehicle.  Another example is a Stage 
II liquid rocket engine (LRE) catastrophic failure which may be a contributor occurring 
while in the parking orbit as the AIC, and the AOC is no FTS and an out-of-orbit reentry 
of the spacecraft alone.  The various contributors resulting in particular AIC and AOC 
have different probabilities of occurrence.
D.2 Set A ssumptions to Bound Failure Scenarios
Given the large number of possible failure scenarios, it is not necessary to 
examine all of them for risk assessment.  Therefore, assumptions are set to bound or 
simplify the failure scenarios while yielding a thorough analysis.  For preliminary vehicle 
breakup analysis, the following assumptions can be made whenever applicable:
1) A mission-ending failure consisting of multiple independent malfunctions is not 
credible and therefore not considered.  
2) For a first-order approximation, incremental velocity from the FTS activation is 
neglected.
3) Following FTS activation, the released spacecraft is tumbling due to uneven and 
asymmetric forces from the FTS, and damage to the spacecraft is negligible.  
4) For a first-order approximation, temperature-dependence in material properties, 
e.g. emissivity, is not considered.
For the analysis of suborbital reentries, thrust cessation with FTS activation can 
be used as a representative failure scenario.  With the assumption that deviation of the 
trajectory from nominal is negligible, the initial condition can be extracted from the 
ascent profile.  An array of FTS activation times is assumed at various points along the 
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ascent trajectory, with higher concentration of cases towards the latter part of the ascent 
where impact in Africa is the likely outcome.  The resulting reentry vehicle configuration 
is dependent on the outcome of the FTS activation since each destruct system may affect 
different parts of the launch vehicle.  For example, the Stage III Star 48 Motor has a 
separate destruct system consisting of two conical shaped charges.  The activation of this 
destruct system may leave only the end dome of the motor attached to the spacecraft as 
the reentry vehicle.  Without the activation of the shaped charges, the launch vehicle’s 
destruct system would leave an almost intact Star 48 motor attached to the spacecraft as 
the reentry vehicle.  Therefore, it is necessary to determine if and which destruct 
system(s) is activated in a failure scenario.  Considering that the FTS was activated, a 
tumbling reentry vehicle would be the only attitude examined with the assumption that 
the forces from the FTS are uneven and asymmetric.
For the analysis of out-of-orbit reentries, typically a set of “cardinal points” 
consisting of 12 or 13 V-Gamma pairs at the boundary of the V-Gamma map is selected 
for analysis.  The points about the V-Gamma map are the limits of reentry conditions 
under the SMB failure scenario and consist of various categories of reentry including the 
prompt reentry, delayed reentry, powered reentry, and COD.  The cardinal points form an 
entry ellipse, and associated with it is a bounding impact footprint which also envelops 
the impact points of the various failure scenarios corresponding to the points within the 
V-Gamma map.  The cardinal points include:
1) Vmax, max for steepest entry
2) Vparabolic, max at the top of the V-Gamma map for steepest entry at parabolic 
speed (can be as steep as -90º)
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3) Vmin, min
4) Vmin, max
5) Vparabolic,  = -5º for high integrated heating case
6) COD
7) PWE with Vmin for retrograde burn that generates opposing velocity
8) PWE with Vmax for posigrade burn that adds to velocity
9) PWE with medium V
10) Additional points to produce a fairly even distribution of points about the V-
Gamma map
The initial vehicle configuration is determined by the reentry time.  For example, 
if the launch vehicle has multiple stages to perform burns while in the parking orbit, e.g. 
Stage II and Stage III, the vehicle in a powered reentry may enter the atmosphere under 
the following scenarios:
1. During the Stage II burn in which the reentry configuration would be spacecraft + 
Stage III with full propellant + Stage II burning with partial propellant
2. During the coast between Stage II and Stage III burns in which the reentry 
configuration would be spacecraft + Stage III with full propellant.  The empty 
Stage II may also be attached depending on if the reentry time is before or after 
staging.  The Stage III burn may be initiated post-entry in the nominal, timed burn 
sequence, if not inhibited by reentry heating and/or forces.
3. During the Stage III burn in which the reentry configuration would be spacecraft 
+ Stage III burning with partial propellant.
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The mass of the remaining propellant in the burning engine/motor in scenarios 1 
and 3 above can be calculated given the reentry time relative to the initiation of the burn 
and the rate of fuel consumption.  The reentry angle-of-attack (EI) in a powered reentry 
is obtained as part of the V-Gamma map calculations.  For the other reentry categories, 
the reentry attitude is arbitrary.  Therefore, the representative vehicle attitudes typically 
examined are reentries with the vehicle face-on (EI = 0º), end-on (EI = 180º), side-on 
(EI = 90º), and tumbling.  Note that there may be different tumbling modes.  The entry 
attitude determines the vehicle ballistic coefficient and the exposure of the vehicle 
components to the flow, thus affecting the trajectory, the breakup sequence, the release of 
the GPHS modules or LWRHU, and the impact point.
Potential failure scenarios that are major contributors to suborbital and out-of-
orbit reentry accident outcome conditions (AOCs) are also examined.  Although the 
suborbital and out-of-orbit reentries mentioned above are representative and bounding 
cases, they do not necessarily correspond to the major initiating failure contributors to 
suborbital and out-of-orbit AOCs.  As an example for suborbital reentry, the loss of 
attitude control during the second stage first burn is the primary failure leading to a 
command destruct action with a nearly intact STAR 48B motor and intact spacecraft as 
the reentry body.  A loss of attitude control and a stage II liquid rocket engine 
catastrophic failure are the two major failure events leading to an out-of-orbit reentry, 
with both contributing about equally to this AOC.
D.3 Determine Spacecraft Configuration and Select Thermal/Force Nodes
From the detailed drawings of the spacecraft, the location(s) of the nuclear-
powered system can be identified.  The nuclear-powered system may be embedded inside 
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other components, e.g. an LWRHU buried inside the MER rover, or it may be a 
protrusion on the spacecraft, e.g. an RTG attached to the bus as in the Ulysses spacecraft.
The spacecraft consists of a multitude of components from which thermal/force 
nodes are selected for failure criteria calculations to form an expected sequence of failure 
leading to the release of the nuclear component.  The components of interest in the 
breakup analysis are typically points of weakness in the spacecraft that are more likely to 
fail, and not components embedded or attached to large heat sinks.  Furthermore, the 
components of interest are those where (1) a failure will cause a significance change in 
the spacecraft configuration or ballistic coefficient, and thus change the course in the 
spacecraft trajectory, or (2) a failure will cause a significant change in the exposure of 
other components to the flow, and thus affects the sequence of breakup.  An example is 
the failure of a fuel tank carrying a large amount of liquid propellant which may not 
cause the drag coefficient to change significantly, but will result in a considerable 
reduction in the spacecraft mass.  Another example is the failure of the solar array on the 
cruise stage since it will cause a significant change in the spacecraft mass, aerodynamic 
drag, and the exposure of other components to the flow.  The thermal blanket which 
usually covers a large surface area of the spacecraft is typically the first to fail, and its 
failure will change the exposure of other components to the flow.  
The thermal/force nodes selected for failure evaluation are not necessarily 
components of large mass or size, but may be relatively small objects serving as supports, 
such as struts, cables, brackets, nuts, and bolts.  For example, the failure of the struts that 
support the star scanner will cause a notable mass reduction, not due to the loss of the 
struts, but due to the loss of the star scanner.  It is necessary to determine how a 
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component is attached to the spacecraft, e.g. bolted down or welded, since that may affect 
the failure criteria.  In the spacecraft drawings, certain supports may not be obvious or 
even shown.  Therefore, discussions with the structural and design engineers to obtain 
such information will be required.    
Large components such as the heatshield and backshell of an aeroshell are often 
joined together by pyrotechnic devices.  The activation of the pyrotechnic devices when 
the autoignition temperature is reached will cause the large components to separate.  The 
locations of the pyrotechnic devices are typically designed in a manner where they are 
well hidden from the flow and embedded in the large components, which act as heat 
sinks.  Therefore, autoignition may not be likely, and pyrotechnic devices can usually be 
neglected in a preliminary analysis.
A component is typically made of uniform material.  If a component is made up 
of multiple materials, then either the component can be divided into multiple nodes, each 
of uniform material, or the averaged material properties can be used for the component 
modeled as a single node to simplify the problem.  An example is the thermal blanket 
consisting of multi-layers of different materials.  The thermal blanket can be divided into 
multiple nodes where each node consists of consecutive layers of the same material, or 
the effective material properties for all the layers can be calculated to model the thermal 
blanket as a single node.
D.4 Collect Information on Node Physical and Material Properties
Once the thermal/force nodes are identified, the physical properties of the nodes 
are obtained from the detailed drawings and mass breakdown of the spacecraft to 
describe the characteristics of each node such as its shape, size, thickness, material type, 
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and mass.  Given the material that makes up a node, the material properties can be 
obtained from material handbooks.  Examples of materials commonly used in spacecraft 
components include aluminum, titanium, graphite epoxy, stainless steel, carbon-carbon, 
and copper [40].  For example, the RTG housing is typically made of aluminum.  For 
materials not found or difficult to find in handbooks such as aerogel (solid insulator), 
vectran (liquid crystal polymer fiber), and SIRCA (thermal shield material), the materials 
engineer should be consulted to obtain the material properties.
To calculate the temperature of a thermal node during a reentry simulation, the 
material thermo-mechanical properties needed include the material emissivity, density, 
specific heat, and thermal conductivity.  Other node physical properties needed for the 
calculation of node temperature include the areas subject to convective, radiative, and 
conductive heat transfer, and the path length of heat conduction.  Note that for some 
materials, there is difficulty in determining parameters at elevated temperatures beyond 
the normal range of usefulness.  For the assessment of node failure, the material melting 
temperature can be used for failure evaluation such that breakup is delayed as compared 
to using a lower failure temperature.  This is a conservative approximation since a 
component typically will break up before reaching the melting temperature due to g-load 
as the material strength is weakened while the component gets heated.
A liquid propellant fuel may fail due to the burst pressure or the burnout flux 
being exceeded.  Typically, the tank is made of titanium, and the liquid fuel is hydrazine.  
To evaluate tank failure due to excessive internal pressure, the tank operating and burst 
pressures are obtained.  The material properties needed include the liquid-dependent 
coefficients for the calculation of vapor pressure of the liquid fuel, the percentage of 
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room temperature tensile yield strength of the tank material, specific heats of the tank 
material and liquid fuel, and emissivity of the tank material.  Other tank physical 
properties needed include the tank and liquid fuel masses, and the tank surface area 
normal to the flow.  To evaluate tank failure caused by exceeding the burnout flux, the 
material properties needed of the liquid fuel include the enthalpy of vaporization, density 
of saturated vapor, surface tension of liquid-vapor, and density of saturated liquid.
D.5 Make Assumptions for Missing Data Based on Engineering Judgment
The detailed drawings and mass breakdown of the spacecraft may not contain all 
the information needed for the calculation of aerodynamic loads on the nodes or the 
failure criteria.  Examples of the physical properties of components that may not be 
specified in the detailed drawings or mass breakdown are the material type and thickness.  
Other pieces of information that may be missing include how a component is attached to 
the spacecraft, e.g. welded or bolted down, and the operating and burst pressures of a 
liquid propellant tank.  Occasionally, discussions with the design engineers to obtain the 
missing information may provide only estimates.  This is especially true if a preliminary 
vehicle breakup analysis is requested during the early phases of the mission design and 
analysis before the spacecraft design matures.  It is then necessary to make assumptions 
for the missing data using typical values from past missions in order to proceed with the 
breakup analysis.  Certain components are almost always made of the same material in 
past missions, e.g. the liquid propellant tank is typically made of titanium.  Other 
components may have wide variation of materials, e.g. struts may be composed of 
aluminum, titanium, stainless steel, or composite tubes.  For these components, aluminum 
can be assumed since it is the most commonly used material in a spacecraft.
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Assumptions made for the missing data should be clearly stated in the final report, 
and the analysis results are valid within these assumptions.  Note that in the breakup 
analysis, the properties of massive and significant components are usually known, even 
during the preliminary design phase.  Thus, the predicted breakup sequence and outcome 
of the reentry usually will not be significantly different if the assumptions made for 
missing data are incorrect, e.g. a strut assumed to be composed of aluminum is actually 
made of titanium, or its thickness is actually 10% more than the assumed value.  
Sometimes the failure of a strut will depend comparatively little on the material and 
thickness, and the time and altitude of the failure will change only slightly.  As the 
spacecraft design evolves and becomes more mature during the latter phases of the 
mission design and analysis, some of the data which were missing will become available 
to perform the detailed breakup analysis.
D.6 Set E xposure Factors
The thermal load on a node depends greatly on the exposure of the node to 
convective heating from the flow, which is described by the exposure factor (EF).  The 
exposure of the node to the flow depends on the vehicle reentry attitude, e.g. flying 
forward or face-on, backward or end-on, side-on, tumbling side-over-side, or tumbling 
end-over-end.  Therefore, the exposure factor of a node is specified for each vehicle 
reentry attitude.  For random tumbling, an average can be taken of tumbling side-over-
side and end-over-end.
A vehicle flying forward, backward, or side-on may begin tumbling when certain 
components break up.  For example, when the aeroshell flying forward or backward fails, 
the released content such as a rover may begin to tumble.  An aerodynamically stable 
90
vehicle flying at an attitude other than trim or tumbling slowly upon reentry may re-orient 
itself due to the stabilizing moment, resulting in the heavy end flying forward.  The 
vehicle reentering from out-of-orbit may be spinning upon reentry if the spin-up sequence 
occurred nominally while in the parking orbit, giving it aerodynamic stability.  As 
components begin to break off, the spinning vehicle may not begin to tumble due to the 
aerodynamic stability, but may begin coning.
A node fully or directly exposed to the flow is given an exposure factor of 1, and 
an exposure factor of 0 means the node is completely hidden from the flow.  A partial 
exposure to the flow would yield an exposure factor between 0 and 1.  The exposure 
factor of a node can be adjusted based on engineering judgment to account for its location 
on the spacecraft and its position relative to other components. The exposure factor has 
direct impact on how quickly the node temperature builds up; the higher the exposure 
factor, the faster the node temperature rises.  Once a node fails, the components that were 
shielded by the node will have increased exposure to the flow.
D.7 Determine Failure Criteria
The vehicle is subject to aerodynamic loads during the accidental reentry, and a 
component may fail by melting, or by breaking away from the vehicle, or by a 
combination of the two.  The component failure may occur due to thermal load alone, e.g. 
the failure of thermal blanket early in the reentry; it may be due to structural load alone, 
e.g. the failure of the content in the aeroshell hidden from the flow but subject to g-load; 
or it may be due to combined thermal and structural loads, e.g. the failure of the RTG 
housing exposed to the flow.  
In the evaluation of thermal node failure, two approaches can be taken:
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1. In one approach, the node temperature is calculated during the reentry simulation 
by modeling the node as a simple shape, such as a slab, a hollow cylinder, or a 
hollow sphere [41].  For example, the solar array is modeled as a slab; a strut is 
modeled as a hollow cylinder; and a liquid propellant tank is modeled as a hollow 
sphere.  The node is assumed to be either a good or poor conductor, and time 
integration of the convective and radiative heat transfer rates over the applicable 
surface areas is performed with consideration for the exposure factor [41].  Note 
that the convective heating on a node is related to the reference stagnation point 
heating by a heating factor defined by the geometry of the node, and cold wall is 
assumed in radiative cooling.  Other options exist to model heat conduction 
between the front and back halves of the node, or between layers in a three-
layered node.  For failure due to thermal load, the node temperature is evaluated 
against the node failure temperature during the reentry simulation, and once the 
failure temperature is exceeded, node failure occurs.
2. In the second approach, given the node properties and exposure factor, the heating 
required to reach the failure temperature can be calculated from the material 
specific heat.  The calculation assumes perfect conduction within the node, but 
does not account for conduction to other nodes.  Radiative cooling can be 
approximated, but is generally not considered until the first round of simulation 
run is made to approximate the time duration of the heat-up or melting phase.  
The heating to reach failure temperature is then adjusted by a heating factor to 
relate to the integrated reference stagnation point heating (Qref) to yield the failure 
integrated heating (Qfail) for the node.  For failure due to thermal load, Qref is 
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evaluated against Qfail during the reentry simulation, and once Qfail is exceeded, 
node failure occurs.  Note that in this approach, Qfail is given relative to Qref.  
Therefore, a higher exposure factor will yield a lower Qfail, such that less time is 
required for Qref to reach the Qfail value for an earlier failure, consistent with what 
is expected from the higher exposure factor.  In this approach, the Qfail of a node 
is dependent on the vehicle attitude and is dictated through the exposure factor.
In general, the second approach is used to calculate the failure criteria of various nodes to 
form the expected sequence of failure and to perform preliminary breakup analysis.  The 
first approach is used for higher-fidelity breakup analysis.
During the early phases of the mission design and analysis, the maximum g-load 
for the spacecraft or the internal content of the aeroshell may be provided.  In the 
trajectory simulation, the trajectory g-load is then evaluated against the maximum g-load 
for the determination of force node failure due to structural load.  During the latter phases 
of the mission design and analysis, the 3 components of failure g-loads in the body frame 
for various supports such as struts, brackets, etc., are provided.  For the assessment of 
failure, the 3 components of g-load for a force node are calculated during the trajectory 
simulation and evaluated against the failure g-load components.  Once one of the failure 
g-load components is exceeded, node failure occurs.
The thermal failure criteria derived based on the failure temperature, e.g. melting 
temperature, is applicable in the absence of structural loads.  Similarly, the failure g-loads 
are applicable in the absence of thermal loads.  For the assessment of failure due to 
combined thermal and structural loads, the thermal and structural failure criteria can be 
combined to form a linear function.  An example is given in Figure 23 where the linear 
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function is formed using a failure integrated heating of 780 J/cm2 and a failure g-load of 
20 gees.  At a given reference integrated heating during the trajectory simulation, node 
failure occurs if the trajectory g-load exceeds the corresponding failure g-load obtained 
from the linear function for the node.
Combined Failure Criteria
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Figure 23.  Combined Failure Criteria
D.8 Determine Expected Sequence of Failure
The sequence of failure in the spacecraft components leading to the release of the 
GPHS modules or LWRHU during an inadvertent reentry may not be obvious at first.  
Therefore, the failure criteria for various components are determined, and are the basis in 
forming an expected sequence of failure.  The order that components break up is 
dependent on the vehicle attitude.  Therefore, a different expected sequence of failure is 
formed for each reentry attitude.
Upon identifying a node, it is useful to list the different ways that the node may 
fail.  For example, a hydrazine tank may fail (1) when the burnout flux is reached, (2) 
when the internal pressure exceeds the burst pressure, or (3) if the brackets holding the 
tank to the vehicle breaks or melts.  It may not be obvious which of the 3 failure criteria 
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will occur first during an accidental reentry.  Therefore, all 3 failure criteria will need to 
be evaluated to determine the one that occurs the earliest, which is then used as the 
criterion for tank failure.  If the tank separates from the spacecraft, the result brings a 
change in mass and possibly in spacecraft attitude.
An LWRHU may be embedded inside other components such that those 
components will need to fail in an “onion-peeling” order before the LWRHU is released.  
An example is an LWRHU embedded inside a rover.  The aeroshell needs to fail first to 
expose the rover to the flow, and the rover panel has to fail to expose the embedded 
LWRHU for release.  Additional layers consisting of other components may exist, 
depending on the design, such as lander, airbag, rover wheels, etc.  
Based on the failure criteria calculated for the nodes and the spacecraft 
configuration, an expected sequence of failure can be formed.  Determining the fate of 
the nuclear component is the primary objective.  Therefore, the outcomes of the 
components that break off of the vehicle after the release of the nuclear component are 
not of concern (unless a debris analysis is requested).  It may be that a component is 
determined to fail after the release of the nuclear component, and thus does not become a 
part of the expected sequence of failure.  The expected sequence of failure is formed 
based on the thermal failure criteria.  Once the trajectory simulation is performed and the 
g-load is calculated in the simulation, the expected sequence of failure may need to be 
updated as the consideration of structural failure criteria may change the breakup 
sequence of the nodes.
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D.9 Determine Ballistic Coefficients of Various Spacecraft Configurations
The initial spacecraft configuration at atmospheric reentry is dependent on the 
failure scenario leading to the reentry.  For example, if the FTS is activated, a significant 
portion of the launch vehicle will be destroyed and therefore not a part of the reentry 
vehicle.  If staging occurred nominally while in the parking orbit, an accidental reentry 
would involve only the spacecraft as the reentry vehicle with arbitrary attitude.  If 
tumbling occurs while in the parking orbit and the contingency procedure prevents 
engine/motor ignition and staging, the tumbling reentry vehicle would be the spacecraft 
with the engine attached and non-thrusting.  The contingency procedures may be mission 
dependent and need to be considered with the failure scenario to determine the initial 
reentry configuration and attitude.  
The subsequent spacecraft configuration and attitude following each failure can 
be determined for the expected sequence of failure developed for each reentry attitude.  
For each spacecraft configuration and attitude, the mass, drag coefficient, and reference 
area are needed for trajectory propagation.  Once a node fails, the mass of the new 
configuration is obtained by subtracting the mass of the failed node.  The CD and Aref
may also need to be updated for the new configuration if the failure of the node has 
changed the aerodynamic characteristics of the vehicle notably.  A Newtonian code 
developed based on Newtonian theory in fluid mechanics is available to calculate the 
hypersonic static aerodynamic coefficients as a function of angle-of-attack.  As a quick 
approximation, subsonic drag coefficient can be assumed to be half the hypersonic value.  
For a tumbling vehicle, the average CD can be used.  Lift is generally assumed to be 
negligible, especially in a tumbling vehicle where lift averages out to zero.  
96
D.10 Predict Vehicle Breakup and Outcome of Nuclear Component
Trajectory simulation is performed for the prediction of vehicle breakup and 
outcome of the nuclear component.  The atmospheric reentry altitude is assumed at 120 
km. Once a node failure is determined, the simulation is interrupted; updates to the 
vehicle mass, CD, and Aref are made; and the simulation is then resumed.  Typically, once 
a component which does not carry the nuclear component breaks away, its trajectory is
no longer tracked unless debris analysis is requested.  In a debris analysis, the outcome of 
the separated component is determined by continuing the propagation of the trajectory 
with modeling of ablation.  Multiple trajectory simulations are performed to cover the 
large spectrum of failure scenarios during ascent and while in the parking orbit.  From the 
simulation results, the probabilities for the release of the nuclear component can be 
determined for suborbital and out-of-orbit reentries.
An object in a ballistic, free flight will converge towards its terminal velocity, 
which is achieved when its drag acceleration cancels the gravitational acceleration in a 
downward trajectory ( = -90º).  The terminal velocity of an object is obtained by:
2 B EarthC g
2$ (75)
where 2$ is the freestream density which decreases exponentially with increasing 
altitude.  The reentry speed of a vehicle is significantly greater than its terminal velocity, 
thus the vehicle will slow down through drag by dissipating its energy in the form of 
heat.  As the forward momentum of the vehicle decreases, its flight path also becomes 
steeper, until terminal velocity condition is achieved.  As the formula for terminal 
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velocity suggests, the vehicle’s ballistic coefficient has a direct impact on its trajectory 
such that a higher ballistic coefficient will cause the vehicle to:
1. Maintain its horizontal velocity longer, which may result in a more shallow flight 
path angle at surface impact
2. Travel further in range
3. Reach the surface sooner
4. Not decelerate as much
5. Have higher terminal velocity, resulting in higher impact speed.
In a suborbital reentry, the vehicle will continue on an upward path following 
launch failure but will eventually return in a fallback trajectory due to insufficient energy 
to capture into orbit.  The heating accumulated during the upward path is assumed to 
dissipate into space while the vehicle is temporarily above the atmosphere before 
returning in the fallback trajectory.  Therefore, the integration of heating for breakup 
analysis will not begin until reentry begins at 120 km.  For a launch failure occurring 
early in the ascent, the vehicle may not exit the atmosphere before beginning the fallback 
trajectory.  In this case, the integration of heating for breakup analysis will begin 
following the launch failure.  Note that the integrated heating during the upward path of 
the trajectory is only a small percentage of the final integrated heating and does not 
contribute significantly to the outcome of vehicle breakup whether it is considered or not.
Smaller components or sharp edges facing the flow receive higher heating rate 
and are typically the first to fail, e.g. a cylindrical strut with small radius.  Larger 
components or blunt shapes are subject to lower heating rate and take longer to fail, e.g. 
heatshield of blunt shape with large nose radius.
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A shallow reentry such as in a COD will incur large integrated heating with 
minimal g-load, hence increasing the likelihood of vehicle breakup and the release of the 
nuclear component due to thermal loads.  The time for the vehicle to reach the Earth 
surface in a shallow reentry is prolonged, thus radiative cooling becomes significant and 
should be modeled in the calculation of failure criteria and the trajectory simulation.  For 
a steep reentry, integrated heating is reduced and the g-load becomes significant.  The 
reduced time for the vehicle to reach the Earth surface allows the radiative cooling to be 
assumed negligible.
Spacecraft components made of aluminum which has relatively low melting 
temperature are inclined to ablate at high altitude and not reach the Earth surface.  The 
breakup of a larger or sturdier vehicle/component usually occurs at lower altitudes.  
Components made of materials such as titanium, stainless steel, or carbon-carbon have 
high melting temperature and will likely ablate at lower altitude or survive to impact the 
surface.
D.11 Perform Sensitivity Analysis and Calculate Impact Footprint
The predicted breakup sequence is accurate within a range of uncertainties, thus 
the impact point is bounded by a footprint defined by semi-major axis, semi-minor axis, 
and azimuth.  The uncertainties result from unknowns associated with the launch failure 
due to limitations on the observables, thus sensitivity analysis is performed to generate 
the envelope of impact points given the uncertainties.  In the event of an accidental 
reentry, the reentry conditions are derived from tracking data with relatively small 
uncertainties, whereas the reentry configuration is typically predicted with less accuracy.  
Therefore, small parametric biases are applied to the initial condition such as entry speed 
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and flight path angle, and vehicle data including reentry mass, CD, and Aref are given 
larger dispersions for downtrack variations.  For crosstrack variations, lift-to-drag ratio 
(L/D) with non-zero bank angle and effects of local wind are applied.  To enhance the 
accuracy of the footprint prediction, real-time local wind profiles downloaded from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website [43] are used in lieu 
of synthetic wind models.  The NOAA wind profiles are updated every 12 hours for 
various stations worldwide and are available to the general public.
For an analysis where the incremental velocity from the FTS activation was 
neglected, an incremental velocity can be added to the initial state vector extracted from 
the ascent profile at the point of failure for sensitivity analysis.  Variations can also be 
applied to assumptions made for the missing data, such as assumed component material, 
thickness, etc.
It is unlikely that uncertainties in the failure criteria would change the outcome of 
the nuclear component in terms of whether it is released from the vehicle or not.  
However, variations in the failure criteria should be applied for sensitivity analysis.  
Dispersions can be applied to the failure integrated heating or failure temperature of each 
node considered in the expected sequence of failures.  At the minimum, the breakup 
times and altitudes will be changed by these variations.
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Appendix E.  Coordinate Transformation Matrices
The direction cosine parameterization is denoted by baC  for transforming from an 
arbitrary a-frame to a second arbitrary b-frame.  The inertial and spherical navigation 
coordinate systems are illustrated in Figure 24.
Figure 24.  Rotating and Spherical Navigation Coordinate Systems
The matrix for transformation from navigation to rotating frame ( RnC ) for -0 rotation 
is:  [44]
cos cos( ) sin( ) sin cos( )
cos sin( ) cos( ) sin sin( )
sin 0 cos
R
nC
    
    
 
0  0  0  != 0 0  0 ! !" #
(76)
where  is the latitude and 0 is defined in Equation (86).  
Referring to Figure 29 for the definitions of angles, the matrix for transformation 
from relative velocity to navigation frame ( nvC ) for - rotation is:
sin 0 cos
sin cos cos sin sin
cos cos sin cos sin
R R
n
v R R R R R
R R R R R
C
 
    
  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where R is the air-relative flight path angle and R is the air-relative azimuth angle.  To 
transform from inertial velocity to navigation frame, simply substitute the relative flight 
path angle and azimuth with inertial terms in the above matrix.  
The matrix for transformation from rotating to inertial frame ( IRC ) is:  [44]
cos( ) sin( ) 0
sin( ) cos( ) 0
0 0 1
I
R
t t
C t t
    !=   ! !" #
(78)
The matrix for transformation from relative velocity to inertial frame ( IvC ) is 
obtained by I I R nv R n vC C C C= , which yields:
c s c c c c
s s c
s c c c s s s
c s
s c s s c s c
c s s c c s
s s s
s c c s s c
c c
s c c s s c s s
s s
c
R R
R
R R R R
R
R R R R
R R
RI
v R R R R
R
R R R R
R
C
            
            
 

                           
         = +  +     +           
+ ( )
c c s
s c
c c c s
R R
R
R R R
      
  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !    !    !    ! !" #
(79)
where c and s denote cosine and sine.  To transform from inertial velocity to inertial 
frame, simply substitute the relative flight path angle and azimuth with inertial terms in 
the above matrix.
The matrix for transformation from relative velocity to body frame ( bvC ) for 
-	-
 or 1-3-2 rotation is:
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sin cos cos sin cos sin
cos cos
sin sin sin cos
sin cos cos cos sin
sin sin cos sin sin sin
sin cos
sin cos cos cos
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where the angle-of-attack (), sideslip (	), and bank (
) are given in Figure 25.
        (a) body x-z plane        (b) body x-y plane        (c) axis of rotation is 
out of paper
Figure 25.  Angle-of-Attack, Sideslip, and Bank
Note that if 
 =  = 	 = 0, the body and relative velocity frames would coincide.
The matrix for transformation from body to inertial frame ( IbC ) for yaw-pitch-roll or 3-2-
1 rotation is:  [45]
c s s
c c
s c s
s s c
s c
c s s
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where the Euler angles roll (roll), pitch (pitch), and yaw (yaw) are shown in Figure 26.
  (a) pitch plane     (b) yaw plane        (c) roll axis out of paper
Figure 26.  Euler Angles:  Roll, Pitch, and Yaw
Note that if the Euler angles are zero, the body and inertial frames would coincide.
The matrix for transformation from orbit-plane to inertial frame ( IoC ) is:  [46]
c c s c
s s
s c s s c c
c s s s
s c
c s c c c c
s s s c c
AOP LAN AOP LAN
LAN
AOP LAN LAN AOP
AOP LAN AOP LANI
o LAN
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AOP AOP
i
i i
C i
i i
i i i
 
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 
 
 
         !          ! !      !=     +  +  !    ! ! !" #
(82)
where the argument of periapsis (AOP), longitude of ascending node (LAN), and 
inclination (i) are given in Figure 27.
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Figure 27 .  Orbital Elements
Note that for ortho-normal basis functions, the following is true:
Tb a
a bC C = " # (83)
The definitions of longitude with respect to various reference frames are given in 
Figure 28.  The axes at t=0 and an arbitrary time, are given in solid and dashed lines, 
respectively.  Note that the inertial axes are time- invariant.
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Figure 28.  Definitions of longitude
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where: ˆmxe = Earth-centered unit vector in the inertial x-y plane and through the local 
meridian of the spacecraft
ˆ
G
xe = Earth-centered unit vector in the inertial x-y plane and through the 
Greenwich meridian
 = Terrestrial longitude measured from the prime meridian

 0 = Initial terrestrial longitude at trajectory initiation (constant value)
 = Celestial longitude measured in inertial frame
 = Rotation rate of planet ( / ˆI IR I ze = v ), assumed constant
t = Time
From Figure 28, the following relations can be derived:
t = 0 +  (84)
0 t = +   (85)
0  0 =  (86)
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Appendix F.  Equations of Motion for 3-DOF Trajectory Propagation
F.1 Air-Relative Motion
The position ( nrv ) and velocity ( nRr
v& ) vectors in navigation frame ( ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  n n nre e e  ) 
are:
ˆ
n n
r
r re=v (87)
/ˆ
n n n n
R r n Rr re r= + ×vv v& & (88)
where:
/ ˆ ˆ ˆsin cos
n n n n
n R re e e      =  +v & & & (89)
/
n
n Rv  is the angular velocity of the navigation frame relative to the rotating frame given 
in navigation frame coordinates.  It is obtained using Equation (86), and the matrix for 
transformation between navigation and rotating frames given in Equation (76).  
Substituting Equation (89) into Equation (88) yields:
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( sin cos ) ( )n n n n n nR r r rr re e e e re     = +  + ×v & & && &
ˆ ˆ ˆcosn n n nR rr re r e r e   = + +v & && & (90)
The relative velocity vector in the velocity frame ( vRr
v& ) is simply: 
ˆ
v v
R R xr v e=v& (91)
where vR is the magnitude of the relative velocity, or Rr&
v
.  Transforming from velocity 
frame to navigation frame using the matrix nvC  in Equation (77) yields:
n n v
R v Rr C r=v v& &
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ˆ ˆ ˆ(sin sin cos cos cos )n n n nR R R r R R R Rr v e e e     = + +v& (92)
The following are obtained by equating the velocity components of Equations (90) and 
(92): 
ˆ :      sin
ˆ :     cos sin cos
ˆ :     cos cos
n
r R R
n
R R R
n
R R R
e r v
e r v
e r v



   
  
=
=
=
&
&
&
Rearranging yields:
sin
cos sin
cos
cos cos
R R
R R R
R R R
r v
v
r
v
r

  
 
=
=
=
&
&
&
(93)
The relative flight path angle is:
1sinR
R
r
v
   =   
& (94)
The acceleration vector in the velocity frame ( vRr
v&& ) is obtained by taking the time 
derivative of Equation (91): 
/ˆ ˆ( )v v v vR R x R v R xr v e v e= + ×v v&& & (95)
/
v
v Rv  is the angular velocity of the velocity frame relative to the rotating frame given in 
velocity frame coordinates.  From Ref. [47]:
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/ ˆcos (cos cos tan sin ) sin tan
ˆsin cos cos
ˆcos (cos tan cos sin ) sin tan
v v
v R R R R R R R x
v
R R R y
v
R R R R R R z
e
e
e
          
     
         
 = +  " #
 +  " #
 +   +" #
v & & &
& &&
& & &
(96)
The following relationships are applied:
3 2
3 1
2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
x y z
y x z
z x y
e e e
e e e
e e e
  
  
  
× = 
× =  +
× = 
v
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Substituting, Equation (95) becomes:
3 2ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆcos (cos tan cos sin ) sin tan
ˆsin cos cos
v v v v
R R x R y z
v v
R x R R R R R R R y
v
R R R R z
r v e v e e
v e v e
v e
 
         
     
= + 
 = +   +" #
   " #
v&& &
& & &&
& &&
(97)
Substituting Equation (93) for the angular rates yields:
ˆ ˆ ˆcos ( cos sin tan ) ( cos )v v v vR RR R x R R R R R y R R R z
v v
r v e v e v e
r r
      =   + v&& && & (98)
The relative acceleration in navigation frame ( nRr
v&& ) is obtained by transforming the above 
equation using the matrix in Equation (77): 
n n v
R v Rr C r=v v&& &&
F.2 Inertial Motion
The position vector in velocity frame ( vrv ) is obtained by transforming Equation 
(87) from the navigation frame using vnC  obtained from the transpose of Equation (77): 
ˆ ˆsin cosv v vR x R zr r e r e = v (99)
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The inertial velocity is obtained by taking the time derivative of Equation (99): 
/
/
ˆ ˆ( sin cos ) sin ( )
ˆ ˆ( cos sin ) cos ( )
v v v v
I R R R x R v I x
v v v
R R R z R v I z
r r r e r e
r r e r e
    
    
= + + ×
   ×
vv& & &
v& &
 (100)
/
v
v Iv  is the angular velocity of the velocity frame relative to the inertial frame given in 
velocity frame coordinates.  From Ref. [47]:
/ ˆcos (cos cos tan sin ) sin tan
ˆsin cos cos
ˆcos (cos tan cos sin ) sin tan
v v
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Note that from Equation (84): 
 = + && (102)
Substituting Equations (93), (101), and (102) into Equation (100) yields:
ˆ ˆ( sin cos cos ) cos cos
ˆsin cos sin
v v v
I R R R x R y
v
R R z
r v r e r e
r e
    
  
= +  + 
+ 
v&
(103)
The inertial acceleration vector is obtained in similar fashion:
2 2 2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
ˆ( sin cos cos cos cos sin )
( cos 2 sin cos cos sin tan
ˆ2 cos sin cos sin cos sin )
( cos 2 sin cos cos cos
cos cos sin
v v
I R R R R x
R
R R R R R R R
v
R R R R y
R
R R R R R R
R
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r
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=  + 
+   
+  
+ +   + 
+
v&& &
&
&
ˆsin ) vR ze 
 (104)
To obtain the inertial flight path angle, first transform Equation (103) from velocity frame 
to navigation frame using the transformation matrix in Equation (77): 
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n n n
I R R R R R R
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v e
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(105)
Referring to Equation (93), the inertial flight path angle obtained from the above equation 
is then:
1 sinsin R RI
I
v
v
   =   
1sinI
I
r
v
   =   
& (106)
The inertial acceleration vector in the navigation frame is obtained by transforming 
Equation (104) from the velocity frame using the transformation matrix in Equation (77): 
n n v
I v Ir C r=v v&& &&
F.3 Relationship Between Inertial and Relative Vectors
Comparing Equations (104) and (98), the inertial acceleration can also be written 
as:
2 2
ˆ(cos cos cos sin sin cos )
ˆcos (2 cos sin 2 tan cos sin sin )
ˆcos (2 sin cos cos cos sin sin )
v v v
I R R R R x
v
R R R R R R y
v
R R R R R z
r r r e
v v r e
v r r e
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 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
+ +  + 
v v&& &&
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Comparing Equations (105) and (92), the inertial velocity can also be written as:
ˆ( cos )n n nI Rr r r e= + v v& &  (108)
Or, comparing Equations (103) and (91) in the velocity frame yields:
ˆ ˆ( sin cos cos ) cos cos
ˆsin cos sin
v v v v
I R R R x R y
v
R R z
r r r e r e
r e
   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= +  + 
+ 
v v& &
(109)
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The following are worth noting:
1. All the terms associated with the rotation of Earth () in the equations describing 
inertial motion contribute to the difference between the relative and inertial 
vectors.  Also, note that the difference is not a function of longitude.  
2. From Equation (108), note that the inertial and relative velocity vectors have the 
same components of velocity radially and tangent to the local meridian.  
3. The “relative velocity” is often referred to as the air-relative, wind-relative, with-
rotating-atmosphere, with-rotating-planet, aerodynamic, freestream, or 
topocentric velocity (assuming no local wind).
F.4 Dynamics
The dynamics modeling includes aerodynamics, thrust, and gravitation:
ˆ ˆ ˆ
v v v v v v v
x x y y z z
v v v
aero thrust grav
F F e F e F e
F F F
. = . + . + .
= + +
v
v v v  (110)
The aerodynamic forces in the velocity frame, body-fixed thrust, and gravitation are 
given in Ref. [41].
Table 14 summarizes the calculations to obtain the thrust force (Fthrust) and rate of 
fuel consumption ( m& ), depending on the inputs provided by the user.
Table 14.  Thrust Calculation
Inputs Thrust m&
Isp, m&
thrust sp EarthF I g m= & given
Isp, Fthrust given
thrust
sp Earth
F
m
I g
=&
where: Fthrust = thrust force
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m& = rate of fuel consumption
Isp = engine specific impulse
gEarth = Earth gravitational acceleration
F.5 Equations of Motion
The force equation in the velocity frame is:
v
IF mr=.
v v&&
where the left-hand-side is the dynamics and the right-hand-side is the kinematics.  The 
inertial acceleration expressed in the velocity frame given in Equation (104) is used:
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Equations (93) and (111) form the set of governing equations for translational motion.
F.6 Transformation of Vehicle State to Rotating Frame
(a) Local horizontal plane (b) Local vertical plane
Figure 29.  Azimuth and Flight Path Angle
It was shown previously that the inertial and relative velocity vectors have the 
same components of velocity radially and tangent to the local meridian.  Thus, the 
following relations are obtained from Figure 29:
cos cos cos cosR R R I I Iv v   = (112)
cos sin cos cos sinR R R I I Iv r v    +  = (113)
sin sinR R I Iv v = (114)
Given the vehicle state in inertial spherical coordinates, the air-relative state can be 
obtained, and vice versa.  Thus, the 3 unknowns are either (vI, I, I) or (vR, R, R), 
depending on the direction of transformation.  The 3 unknowns are solved using the 3 
equations in (112) through (114), as discussed in the following subsections.
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F.7 Inertial State to Air-Relative State in Spherical Coordinates
The vehicle state in inertial spherical coordinates consists of the inertial velocity 
(vI), inertial flight path angle (I), latitude (), longitude (), radius (r), and inertial 
azimuth (I).  Rearranging Equation (112), the following is obtained:
cos cos
cos
cos
I I I
R R
R
v
v
  = (115)
Substituting into Equation (113) yields:
tan cos cos cos cos sinR I I I I I Iv r v     +  = (116)
Rearranging,
1 cos sin costan
cos cos
I I I
R
I I I
v r
v
    
 = (117)
Note that the correct quadrant for the azimuth needs to be evaluated.  Rearranging 
Equation (114) yields:
sin
sin
I I
R
R
v
v

=
Substitute into Equation (115) and rearrange:
1 cos tantan
cos
R I
R
I
  
  =  !" #
(118)
The sign of R is the same as that of I.  The above equation is solved after Equation (117)
such that R is known.  Next, the air-relative speed is solved:
sin
sin
I I
R
R
v
v

= (119)
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In the case of a circular orbit, Equation (119) encounters the divide-by- zero problem.  
The relative speed should then be solved by rearranging Equation (112) or (113), for 
example:
sin cos cos
cos sin
I I I
R
R R
v r
v
  
 
= (120)
At the maximum/minimum latitude (where  = ± inclination), I = R = ± 90º.  In this 
case, Equation (118) for calculating the air-relative flight path angle encounters the 
divide-by-zero problem.  Alternatively, Equations (113) and (114) are used to obtain the 
solution:
1 sin sintan
cos sin cos
I R I
R
I I I
v
v r
    
  =  !" #
(121)
F.8 Air-Relative State to Inertial State in Spherical Coordinates
The vehicle state in rotating spherical coordinates consists of the air-relative 
velocity (vR), air-relative flight path angle (R), latitude (), longitude (), radius (r), and 
air-relative azimuth (R).  Rearranging Equation (112), the following is obtained:
cos cos
cos
cos
R R R
I I
I
v
v
  = (122)
Substituting into Equation (113) yields:
cos sin cos cos cos tanR R R R R R Iv r v     +  = (123)
Rearranging,
1 cos sin costan
cos cos
R R R
I
R R R
v r
v
    
 + = (124)
The correct quadrant for I needs to be evaluated.  Rearranging Equation (114) yields:
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Substituting into Equation (122) and rearranging,
1 cos tantan
cos
I R
I
R
  
  =  !" #
(125)
The sign of I is the same as that of R.  The above equation is solved after Equation (124)
such that I is known.  Next, the inertial speed is solved:
sin
sin
R R
I
I
v
v

= (126)
F.9 Inertial State in Cartesian Coordinates to Air-Relative State in Spherical 
Coordinates
In the event of a launch failure, the initial vehicle state in inertial frame Cartesian 
coordinates based on tracking data is provided by the Air Force Space Command.  
Therefore, transformation from the inertial Cartesian coordinates to the rotating spherical 
coordinates is needed.  The vehicle state in inertial Cartesian coordinates is given by:
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
I I I I
x y z
I I I I
I x y z
r Xe Ye Ze
v Ue Ve We
= + +
= + +
v
v (127)
such that:
2 2 2
r X Y Z= + +  (128)
2 2 2
Iv U V W= + +  (129)
The latitude, longitude, and azimuth are given by:
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1sin Z
r
   =    (130)
1tan
Y
X
   =    (131)
1 sin costan
sin cos sin sin cosI
U V
U V W
   
    + =  !    +" # (132)
Note that the correct quadrant for the azimuth needs to be evaluated.  The radial velocity 
is obtained by:
ˆ
I I
Ir v r= •v& (133)
The inertial flight path angle is:
1sinI
I
r
v
 = & (134)
The inertial vehicle state in spherical coordinates is then transformed to the rotating, 
spherical coordinates.
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Appendix G.  MER Data for Vehicle Breakup Analysis
Information on the MER spacecraft, launch vehicle, thermal nodes, exposure 
factors, failure criteria, etc, required to perform vehicle breakup analysis are given in this 
section.
G.1 Task Description
The MER pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis required trajectory simulations 
with thermal and structural modeling for the prediction of the LWRHU footprint.  Before 
the vehicle breakup analysis could be performed, much research was needed to collect 
essential information such as the vehicle configuration, possible reentry scenarios, 
requirements to meet task objectives, and so forth.  Detailed discussions of the above 
tasks and the results of the vehicle breakup analysis are given in the following 
subsections.
G.2 Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Configuration
The MER-A and MER-B spacecraft were launched using Delta II 7925 and Delta 
II 7925H launch vehicles, respectively.  The differences between the two launch vehicles 
were assumed negligible for vehicle breakup purposes, and only one configuration was 
analyzed.  The launch vehicle configuration is given in Figure 30 [57].  Major 
components of the launch vehicle included First Stage, Second Stage, Third-Stage motor, 
nine Graphite Epoxy Motors (GEM), and Fairing.  In the event of an unrecoverable 
vehicle malfunction in the launch vehicle, the Flight Termination System (FTS) would be 
activated either automatically or by command, to terminate vehicle thrust and disperse 
propellants [57].  For MER, the third stage motor had two additional large conical shaped 
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charges mounted on the Payload Attach Fitting (PAF) with the outputs directed into the 
dome of the motor (in the direction of the spacecraft).
Figure 30.  Delta II 7925 Launch Vehicle Configuration
The MER-A and MER-B spacecrafts were identical, and the configuration is given in 
Figure 31 [57].  Major components of the spacecraft included the Heatshield (H/S), 
Backshell (B/S), Cruise Stage (CS), Lander, and Rover.
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Figure 31.  MER Spacecraft Configuration
G.3 Mission Timeline
The launch window for MER-A and MER-B extended from May 30 to July 15, 
2003.  Two launch opportunities existed for each day, at launch azimuth of 93º and 99º, 
respectively.  The mission timeline depended on the day of launch and the launch 
opportunity.  For example, the timelines of the actual days of launch for MER-A and 
MER-B corresponding to the first and second launch opportunities on June 10 and July 7, 
respectively, are given in Table 15 [58].
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Table 15.  Mission Timelines
Event MER-A, June 10, 2003 
Azimuth 93º (sec)
MER-B, July 7, 2003 
Azimuth 99º (sec)
Liftoff 0.000 0.000
Jettison 6 GL GEM 66.000 80.500
Jettison 3 AL GEM 131.500 159.500
MECO 263.409 263.469
Stage I – II Separation 271.409 271.469
Jettison Fairing 282.000 282.000
SECO 1 578.489 528.447
First Restart – Stage II 1588.686 4317.164
SECO 2 1714.543 4466.730
Fire Spin Rockets 1764.543 4516.730
Jettison Stage II 1767.543 4519.730
Stage III Ignition 1804.543 4556.730
Stage III Burnout 1891.683 4643.870
Initiate Yo-Yo Despin 2174.543 4926.730
Jettison Stage III 2179.543 4931.730
where: GL = Ground Lit
AL = Air Lit
MECO = Main Engine Cutoff
SECO = Second Stage Engine Cutoff
G.4 Assumptions and Considerations
From the time of liftoff until the MER spacecraft began the interplanetary cruise 
to Mars, an unrecoverable vehicle malfunction could occur to end the mission with the 
possibility of atmospheric reentry of the vehicle to impact Earth surface.  To bound the 
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failure scenarios for vehicle breakup analysis, the following assumptions and 
considerations were imposed:
1. The FTS would be activated upon unrecoverable vehicle malfunction during the 
ascent phase.
2. A mission-ending failure consisting of multiple independent malfunctions were 
not credible and therefore not considered.
3. Before failure occurred, the launch vehicle was on course and did not deviate 
from the nominal path.  After the FTS activation, the debris remained on course.
4. Incremental velocity from the FTS activation was neglected.  Therefore, the end 
condition of the launch vehicle trajectory was the initial condition for the debris 
trajectory.
5. The spacecraft configuration remained undamaged after the FTS activation.
6. A 50 kg mass representing the end dome from the Stage III motor would survive 
the FTS activation and remain attached to the spacecraft.
7. The forces exerted on the spacecraft from the activation of two shaped charges as 
part of the FTS would likely be uneven and asymmetric.  Therefore, the 
spacecraft was assumed to be tumbling after the FTS activation.
8. Timed sequences in the parking orbit would occur nominally unaffected by the 
failure, including the start and end of burns, staging, and spin up.  This was 
consistent with the assumptions made in the V-Gamma Map.
9. Thrust misalignment in the parking orbit would be fixed in the inertial frame and 
prevailed through the Stage II and Stage III burns.  This was consistent with the 
assumptions made in the V-Gamma Map.
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Material surface emissivity (1) was assumed constant and invariant to temperature.
G.5 Reentry Scenarios
The multitude of possible unrecoverable vehicle malfunctions would lead to 
various reentry scenarios.  The reentry scenarios were categorized into two types:  (1) 
suborbital and (2) out-of-orbit.
The suborbital reentries resulted from failures during the ascent.  An 
unrecoverable vehicle malfunction during the ascent would trigger an automated or 
commanded activation of the FTS.  After the destruction of the launch vehicle, the freed 
spacecraft would continue on its upward trajectory.  Unable to escape due to gravity, the 
spacecraft would eventually head back towards Earth in a fallback trajectory.  The 
outcome would be a nominal surface impact point, accurate within a range of 
uncertainties defined by a footprint.  The nominal impact point was unique, dependent 
specifically on the point in the ascent trajectory at which the FTS was activated.  A FTS 
activation early in the ascent while the vehicle speed was still relatively low would result 
in a surface impact in the Atlantic Ocean.  A FTS activation late in the ascent after the 
vehicle had picked up speed would result in an impact point in Africa.  Therefore, the 
suborbital reentries were further categorized into two types:  (1) low speed for ocean 
impact and (2) high speed for land impact.  The spacecraft was assumed to be tumbling in 
suborbital reentries due to asymmetric forces from the conical shaped charges in the 
activation of the FTS.
The out-of-orbit reentries resulted from failures while in the parking orbit after a 
successful ascent.  A failure while in the parking orbit could be the result of steady 
misaligned burns (SMB), an incomplete burn, or no burn in the Stage II and III engines.  
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The thrust misalignment was measured by the cone and clock angles in the yaw plane and 
about the roll axis, respectively.  Depending on the misaligned burns, the spacecraft 
would be propelled into a specific orbit, with an atmospheric reentry as a possible 
outcome of the SMB.  The reentries were categorized into six classes:  (1) prompt 
elliptic, (2) delayed elliptic, (3) powered entry, (4) circular orbit decay or COD, (5) decay 
of an initial ellipse, and (6) prompt hyperbolic.  The delayed elliptic reentry involved the 
spacecraft passing through the apogee before reentering the atmosphere.  Thus, the 
spacecraft would be separated from Stage III and spinning.  The powered entry involved 
the spacecraft reentering the atmosphere during the Stage II burn, coast, or Stage III burn.  
Thus, the spacecraft could be reentering at different speeds and angles, depending on the 
cone and clock angles.  The COD could result from a scenario where the spacecraft was 
left in Earth orbit, separated from the Stage III motor, unable to boost to a Sufficiently 
High Orbit (SHO), unable to control attitude, spinning at two rpm, and finally de-orbited 
after prolonged drag effects.  The powered entry, delayed elliptic, and COD were 
considered for out-of-orbit reentry scenarios.  The spacecraft was assumed to be spinning 
in out-of-orbit reentries due to the firing of the spin rockets following SECO 2 as part of 
the nominal timeline (see Table 15).
In summary, the reentry scenarios considered included:
1. Suborbital Reentry
a. Low speed (fallback trajectory resulting in ocean impact point in Atlantic 
Ocean)
b. High speed (fallback trajectory resulting in ground impact point in Africa)
2. Out-of-orbit Reentry
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a. Circular orbit decay
b. Delayed elliptic
c. Powered reentry
G.6 Thermal Nodes
Vehicle breakup could occur due to aerodynamic heating and/or g-load.  For 
thermal and structural analyses, the launch vehicle and spacecraft were analyzed in detail 
to determine the weak points where failure was likely to occur.   Based on this 
information, the vehicles were then divided into components and modeled as thermal 
nodes.  The thermal nodes included major components and supports on the launch vehicle 
and spacecraft as described in the following subsections.
G.6.1 Cruise Stage Thermal Nodes
Twenty-five thermal nodes were identified for the Cruise Stage as shown in 
Figure 32.  
Figure 32.  Cruise Stage Thermal Nodes
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The characteristics and material properties of the 25 Cruise Stage thermal nodes used in 
the vehicle breakup analysis are given in Table 16 and were applicable to both MER-A 
and MER-B.
Table 16.  Properties of Cruise Stage Thermal Nodes
Node 
#
Node Name Mass 
(kg)
Shape d 
(cm)
Radius 
(cm)
Material 1 Density 
(g/cm3)
c 
(J/g/C)
1 Cluster strut 1 cyl 0.089 1.27 Ti-6-4 0.12 4.5 0.71
2 Star scanner 
strut
1 cyl 0.089 0.794 Ti-6-4 0.12 4.5 0.71
3 IPA strut 1 cyl 0.089 1.27 Al 2297 0.09 2.7 1.027
4 Propellant 
tube
1 cyl 0.05 0.318 S/S 316 0.14 7.9 0.639
5 HRS tube 1 cyl 0.05 0.318 S/S 316 0.14 7.9 0.639
6 Star scanner 
cone
1.08 cyl 0.025 6.35 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
7 Intercostal 0.63 cyl 0.178 5.08 Al 2297 0.09 2.7 1.027
8 Rib (12) 1.11 cyl 0.152 5.08 Al 2297 0.09 2.7 1.027
9 Torus 9.49 cyl 0.229 10.16 Al 2295 0.09 2.7 2.7
10 Honeycomb 
faceskin
195 sph 0.013 129.54 Al 2024 0.09 2.7 1.027
11 LVA plate 28.6 sph 1.614 45.72 Al 7075 0.09 2.7 1.027
12 HRS box 0.42 sph 0.042 8.89 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
13 Fiberglass 
cable sleeve
4 cyl 0.152 2.54 Fglass/E 0.8 2.5 0.78
14 Circuit board 0.08 sph 0.127 7.62 Fglass/E 0.8 2.5 0.78
15 Star scanner 
electronics 
box
4.32 sph 0.102 5.08 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
16 IPA box 7.3 sph 0.102 12.065 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
17 PDM box 2.09 sph 0.102 9.525 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
18 CEM box 4.11 sph 0.102 10.16 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
19 SSE box 1.13 sph 0.157 8.255 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
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20 Hydrazine 
tank GE skin
2.91 sph 0.025 20.955 Ti-6-4 0.8 1.39 0.92
21 Hydrazine 
tank Al skin
2.91 sph 0.015 20.955 – 0.09 2.7 1.027
22 Thruster 
cluster
2.8 sph 0.541 6.35 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
23 Shark fin 
radiator
1.4 sph 0.686 19.431 Al 6061 0.09 2.7 1.027
24 CSLA box 2 sph 0.102 9.906 Albemet 0.09 2.7 1.027
25 Cable copper 
braid
3.6 cyl 0.051 2.286 Cu 102 0.1 8.96 0.38
where: IPA = Integrated Pump Assembly
HRS = Heat Rejection System
LVA = Launch Vehicle Adapter
PDM = Propellant Distribution Module
CEM = Cruise Electronics Module
SSE = Sun Sensor Electronics
GE = graphite epoxy
Al = Aluminum
CSLA = Cruise Shunt Limiter Assembly
d = Component thickness
c = Material specific heat
cyl = Cylinder
sph = Sphere
Ti = Titanium
S/S = Stainless Steel
Fglass/E = Fiberglass / Epoxy
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Cu = Copper
G.6.2 Launch Vehicle and Entry Vehicle Thermal Nodes
In addition to the above twenty-five Cruise Stage thermal nodes [17], the 
following launch vehicle and entry vehicle thermal nodes listed in Table 17 were 
identified.
Table 17.  Launch Vehicle and Entry Vehicle Thermal Nodes
Thermal NodeNode #
Suborbital Reentry Out-of-Orbit Reentry
26 Thermal Protection System 
(TPS)
Stage III Ti Case
27 H/S Shoulder LVA2
28 B/S Large End Hot Side Small Cone
29 B/S Large End All Cone Nose
30 B/S Small End Hot Side Shoulder
31 B/S Small End All Cone LVA
32 Airbags Airbags
33 Petal Struts Petal Struts
34 Aerogel Rover Al Plate
35 Rover Al Plate -
For a suborbital reentry, the entry vehicle consisted of the Aeroshell, Lander, Rover, and 
Cruise Stage, and the thermal nodes are defined in Figure 33.  Note that the spacecraft is 
illustrated as tumbling in the clockwise direction where the axis of rotation is out of the 
paper.  Thus, the plane of the paper acts as the plane of symmetry in the definition of the 
thermal nodes.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 33.  (a) Aeroshell and (b) Lander and Rover Thermal Nodes in Suborbital 
Reentry
Direction 
of tumble
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The entry and launch vehicle thermal nodes in an out-of-orbit entry are shown in Figure 
34.  The Lander and Rover nodes are not illustrated but are the same as those defined in 
Figure 33, except with different node number for the Rover aluminum plate.
Figure 34.  Entry and Launch Vehicle Thermal Nodes in Out-of-Orbit Reentry
G.7 Failure Criteria
Failure criteria were specified in terms of temperature for the Cruise Stage nodes, 
total integrated reference heating (Qref) for the launch vehicle and Aeroshell, and delta 
integrated reference heating (0Qref) for the Lander and Rover nodes.  The failure criteria 
in the form of integrated heating were derived based on the Aeroshell integrated heating 
load limit provided by Lockheed Martin (LMA) and were dependent on the orientation of 
the vehicle to the flow.  The failure criteria are given in the following subsections.  Note 
that in the case of a steep entry, a g-load failure criterion of 30 gees with no heating was 
also considered [59].
26
27
28
29
30
31
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G.7.1 Failure Criteria for Cruise Stage Nodes
The failure temperatures for the twenty-five Cruise Stage nodes were set to the 
melting temperatures of the materials and were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.  
The failure temperatures were applicable for both suborbital and out-of-orbit reentries.  
For a Cruise Stage node, the temperatures for the node modeled as poor and good 
conductors were calculated.  For node failure assessment, the average of these two 
temperatures was compared with the node failure temperature.
The following conditions were also imposed in the failure assessment of the 
Cruise Stage nodes:
1. If Node 1 (Cluster strut) failed, Node 22 (Thruster cluster) also failed.
2. If Node 2 (Star scanner strut) failed, Node 6 (Star scanner cone) also failed.
3. If Node 3 (IPA strut) failed, Nodes 16 (IPA box) and 24 (CSLA box) also failed.
4. If Node 8 (Rib 12) failed, all nodes except for 7 (Intercostal), 9 (Torus), and 11 
(LVA) also failed.
G.7.2 Failure Criteria for Aeroshell
The Aeroshell failure criteria were provided by Lockheed Martin (LMA) [60].  
The inadvertent Earth entry of the MER Aeroshell as part of launch failure analysis was 
evaluated.  Assumptions for this case were a low circular Earth orbit with the Aeroshell 
separated from its Cruise Stage.  LMA had assessed the inadvertent Earth entry of the 
MER vehicle in its Mars entry configuration and determined that the Aeroshell failed 
before reaching the ground, both in the Heatshield-leading and Backshell-leading 
orientations.
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G.7.3 Failure Criteria for Entry Spacecraft
In a suborbital reentry, the entry vehicle was assumed to be tumbling due to 
uneven, asymmetric forces from the shaped charges.  The failure criteria for the entry 
spacecraft were derived based on the physical and thermal properties of the nodes [61-
63].  The failure integrated heating for the entry vehicle thermal nodes in a suborbital 
reentry are given in Table 18 and were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.  Note that 
launch vehicle nodes did not exist in suborbital reentries due to the activation of the FTS.  
It was assumed that if the B/S small end all cone failed, then the entire Aeroshell would 
be separated from the Lander/Rover.
Table 18.  Failure Integrated Heating for Entry Vehicle in Suborbital Reentry
Thermal Node Failure Qref (J/cm2)
TPS 36588
H/S Shoulder 11156
B/S large end hot side 14844
B/S large end all cone 11156
B/S small end hot side 5578
B/S small end all cone 11156
Airbags 0 = 1129
Petal struts 0 = 123
Aerogel 0 = 279
Rover Al plate 0 = 96
In an out-of-orbit reentry, the entry spacecraft was assumed to be spinning at a fixed 
angle-of-attack.  The angle-of-attack dependent failure integrated heating are given in 
Table 19 and were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.  Note that for thermal nodes 
not applicable in the expected sequence of failure, the failure criteria were not derived.
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Table 19.  Failure Integrated Heating for Entry and Launch Vehicles in Out-of-
Orbit Reentry
Failure Qref
(J/cm2)
Failure Qref
(J/cm2)
Failure Qref
(J/cm2)
Thermal Node
 = 0°  = 90°  = 180°
Stage III Ti Case N/A 1607 N/A
LVA2 N/A 2867 N/A
Small cone N/A 4522 2011
Nose 9147 N/A N/A
Shoulder 10724 N/A N/A
LVA N/A N/A 4000
Airbags 0 = 1130 0 = 4000 0 = 5000
Petal struts 0 = 123 0 = 400 0 = 6000
Al Plate 0 = 375 
(bottom plate)
0 = 1000 
(side plate)
0 = 500 
(top plate)
G.8 Exposure Factors
Exposure factors were applicable only to Cruise Stage thermal nodes since the 
failure analysis was based on temperature and not integrated heating.  After a node failure 
had been verified, the exposure factor for the failed node became 0.  For entry vehicle 
thermal nodes, the exposure factors were absorbed into the derived, angle-of-attack 
dependent failure integrated heating.
G.8.1 Suborbital Reentry Exposure Factors
The spacecraft was assumed to be tumbling in a suborbital reentry.  Therefore, 
only one set of exposure factors was used for all suborbital reentries.  The exposure 
factors were updated once, when the solar array substrate, or Node 10, failed.  The solar 
array substrate partially shielded many Cruise Stage thermal nodes from exposure to the 
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flow, and its failure significantly increased the exposure of these nodes to the flow.  The 
exposure factors are given in Table 20 and were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.
Table 20.  Exposure Factors for Suborbital Reentries
Node # At t = 0 sec After Failure 
of Node 10
1 – 9, 12 – 25 0.25 0.75
10 0.5 0.0
11 0.5 0.75
G.8.2 Out-of-Orbit Reentry Exposure Factors
The exposure factors for the Cruise Stage nodes in an out-of-orbit reentry were 
dependent on the entry angle-of-attack.  The exposure factors are given in Table 21 and 
were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.
Table 21 .  Exposure Factors for Out-of-Orbit Reentries
 = 0°  = 90°  = 180°
Node # t = 0 sec After Failure 
of Node 10
t = 0 sec After Failure 
of Node 12
t = 0 sec After Failure 
of Node 10
1, 6, 18 - 22 0.25 0.25 0.32 1/ 0.14 0.9
2 – 4, 7 – 8, 13 
– 15, 17, 23, 25
0.25 0.25 0.06 1/ 0.0 0.9
5 0.25 0.25 0.31 1/ 0.14 0.43
9, 11 0.0 0.1 0.06 1/ 0.0 0.9
10 0.25 0.0 0.06 1/ 0.9 0.0
12 0.25 0.25 0.31 0.0 0.14 0.43
16, 24 0.25 0.25 0.32 1/ 0.0 0.9
135
G.9 Expected Sequence of Failures and Vehicle Properties Updates
During the reentry, vehicle breakup caused the vehicle configuration to change 
and vehicle properties such as vehicle mass (m), CD, and Aref were updated accordingly.  
The expected sequence of failures for the reentry scenarios were developed to obtain the 
various vehicle configurations, and vehicle properties for these configurations were 
determined.  In a suborbital reentry, the vehicle was assumed to be tumbling and only one 
expected sequence of failures was considered.  The expected sequence of failures in a 
suborbital reentry and the vehicle properties updates including the ballistic coefficient 
(CB) are listed in Table 22.
Table 22.  Expected Sequence of Failures and Vehicle Properties Updates in 
Suborbital Reentry
Mass (kg) CB (kg/m2)Event
MER-A MER-B 
CD Aref
(m2) MER-A MER-B 
At t = 0 sec 1127 1131.511 1.11 5.5 184.6 185.34
Failure of Node 
10
932 kg 
subtract 
masses of 
other nodes 
which failed 
before Node 
10 failure
936.511 kg 
subtract masses 
of other nodes 
which failed 
before Node 10 
failure
1.11 5.5 depend 
on 
updated 
mass
depend 
on 
updated 
mass
Failure of entire 
CS & Aeroshell
762 766.511 1.11 2.01 341.54 343.56
Failure of 
airbags & petals
180 184.511 1.25 0.5 288 295.22
Failure of 
aerogel & Al 
plate, free RHU
0.04 0.04 1.333 8.32 x 
10-4 
36.07 36.07
For out-of-orbit reentries, the mass of the entry vehicle depended on the type of reentry.  
For example, for delayed elliptic and COD, the spacecraft had separated from Stage III.  
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For powered entry, the vehicle consisted of the spacecraft with Stage III, and perhaps also 
Stage II, depending on the time of entry.  The vehicle would be thrusting, or the reentry 
could occur during coast and Stage III would ignite post-entry.  The entry masses for 
COD and delayed reentries were 1077.01 kg for MER-A and 1081.511 for MER-B.  The 
entry mass for powered entries was dependent on the entry time.  The vehicle mass was 
updated by subtracting the masses of failed nodes.  The node masses are given in Table 
23.
Table 23.  Node Masses for Updates
Mass (kg)Component
MER-A MER-B 
CS (less LVA) 201.6 206.111
LVA 33.5 33.5
Stage II Fuel 1615.1 1615.1
Empty Stage II 1146.8 1146.8
Stage III Fuel 2018.9 2018.9
Empty Stage III Ti Case 164.6 164.6
LVA2 50 50
Nose (H/S less shoulder) 80 80
Cone (B/S less shoulder) 197.5 197.5
Shoulder 10 10
Airbags 111.1 111.1
Petals 263.2 263.2
Rover 180.1 180.1
RHU 0.04 0.04
Total 6072.4 6072.4
The expected sequence of failures was dependent on the vehicle orientation to the flow.  
The expected sequence of failures and the vehicle properties updates in an out-of-orbit 
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reentry at entry angle-of-attack of 0º, 90º, and 180º are given in Table 24, Table 25, and 
Table 26, respectively, and were applicable to both MER-A and MER-B.
Table 24.  Expected Sequence of Failures and Vehicle Properties Updates in Out-of-
Orbit Reentry at Entry Angle-of-Attack of 0º
Event CD Aref (m2)
At t = 0 sec 1.65 5.52
Failure of CS nodes 1.65 5.52
Failure of Nose 1.65 5.52
Failure of Shoulder 1.65 5.52
Failure of Airbags 1.65 5.52
Failure of Petals 1.65 5.52
Failure of Rover bottom plate, free RHU 1.333 8.32 x 10-4 
Table 25.  Expected Sequence of Failures and Vehicle Properties Updates in Out-of-
Orbit Reentry at Entry Angle-of-Attack of 90º
Event CD Aref (m2)
At t = 0 sec 1.25 3.92
Failure of CS Node 12 1.25 3.92
Failure of rest of CS nodes and Stage 
III Ti Casing (stops thrust)
1.25 2.5
Failure of LVA2 1.25 2.5
Failure of Small cone (lose Aeroshell) 1.25 1.59
Failure of Airbags, side on 1.25 1.59
Failure of Petals, side on 2.0 0.59
Failure of Rover side plate, free RHU 1.333 8.32 x 10-4
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Table 26.  Expected Sequence of Failures and Vehicle Properties Updates in Out-of-
Orbit Reentry at Entry Angle-of-Attack of 180º
Event CD Aref (m2)
At t = 0 sec 1.04 5.52
Failure of CS Node 10 1.04 5.52
Failure of rest of CS nodes 1.04 5.52
Failure of small cone (lose Aeroshell) 1.7 1.82
Failure of LVA 1.7 1.82
Failure of Airbags, side on 1.7 1.17
Failure of Petals, side on 2.0 0.59
Failure of Rover top plate, free RHU 1.333 8.32 x 10-4
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Appendix I.  Acronyms
AEPL Atmospheric-Entry, Powered-Landing simulator
AIC Accident Initial Conditions
AL Air Lit
ANSE Aerospace Nuclear Safety Engineer
AOC Accident Outcome Condition
ARL Air Resources Laboratory
B/S Backshell
CDS Command Destruct System
CEM Cruise Electronics Module
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
c.g. Center of Gravity
COD Circular Orbit Decay
CORDS Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies
CS Cruise Stage
CSLA Cruise Shunt Limiter Assembly
DAS Debris Assessment Software
DEL Orbit Decay Reentry
DOF Degree Of Freedom
DTO Detailed Test Objectives
ECI Earth-Centered Inertial
EDL Entry, Descent, and Landing
EI Entry Interface
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EIS Environmental Impact Statement
ELD Delayed Reentry
ELP Prompt Reentry
ESA European Space Agency
ESOC European Space Operations Centre
Fglass/E Fiberglass / Epoxy
FS Facesheet
FTS Flight Termination System
GE Graphite Epoxy
GEM Graphite Epoxy Motors
GL Ground Lit
GPHS General Purpose Heat Source
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center
HES Hyperbolic Escape
HP Prompt Hyperbolic Reentry
HRS Heat Rejection System
H/S Heatshield
IAA International Academy of Astronautics
IMOS Integrated Modeling of Optical Systems
INSRP Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
IOM InterOffice Memorandum
IPA Integrated Pump Assembly
JAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
149
JIMO Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter
JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory
LAURA Langley Aerothermodynamic Upwind Relaxation Algorithm
LEM Lunar Excursion Module
LMA Lockheed Martin
LRE Liquid Rocket Engine
LVA Launch Vehicle Adapter
LWRHU Light Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit
MECO Main Engine Cutoff
MER Mars Exploration Rover
MSL Mars Science Laboratory
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASTRAN NASA Structural Analysis computer program
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPS Nuclear Power System
ORSAT Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool
PAF Payload Attach Fitting
PDM Propellant Distribution Module
PLF Payload Fairing
POST Program to Optimize Simulated Trajectories
PWE Powered Reentry
REN Radial, East, North
RTG Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
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SAR Safety Analysis Report
SECO Second Stage Engine Cutoff
SINDA/G Systems Improved Numerical Differencing Analyzer/Gaski
SMB Steady Misaligned Burn
S/S Stainless Steel
SSE Sun Sensor Electronics
TPS Thermal Protection System
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Appendix J.  Symbols
a Semi-major axis
Aflow Surface area normal to flow
Al Aluminum
Aref Reference area
 Angle-of-attack
a Angle-of-attack of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic velocity
	 Sideslip angle
	a Sideslip angle of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic velocity
c Specific heat
b
aC Matrix to transform from a-frame to b-frame
CB Ballistic coefficient
Ccorr Correlation coefficient
CD Drag coefficient
CL Lift coefficient
Cl Rolling moment coefficient
Cm Pitching moment coefficient
Cn Yawing moment coefficient
R
nC Matrix to transform from navigation frame to rotating frame
I
oC Matrix to transform from orbit-plane frame to inertial frame
I
RC Matrix to transform from rotating frame to inertial frame
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b
vC Matrix to transform from velocity frame to body frame
I
vC Matrix to transform from velocity frame to inertial frame
n
vC Matrix to transform from velocity frame to navigation frame
c.g. Center of Gravity
Cu Copper
D Drag force
d Component thickness
_ /fail B SQ0 Failure integrated heating for backshell
_ /fail H SQ0 Failure integrated heating for heatshield
_fail shoulderQ0 Failure integrated heating for aeroshell shoulder
0Qheatup Heating to reach the melting point from room temperature
0Qmelt Integrated heating to melt component
0 Longitude with respect to rotating frame x-axis (which is not necessarily 
the Greenwich meridian)
0T Rise in temperature

 Bank angle

a Bank angle of the spacecraft relative to the aerodynamic velocity
e Eccentricity
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  
b b b
x y ze e e Body frame unit vectors
ˆ
G
x
e Earth-centered unit vector in the inertial x-y plane and through the 
Greenwich meridian
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ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  
I I I
x y ze e e Inertial frame unit vectors
ˆ
m
x
e Earth-centered unit vector in the inertial x-y plane and through the local 
meridian of the spacecraft
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  
n n n
re e e  Navigation frame unit vectors
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  
R R R
x y ze e e Rotating frame unit vectors
ˆ ˆ ˆ,  ,  
v v v
x y ze e e Velocity frame unit vectors
1 Emissivity
f True Anomaly
v
aeroF
v
Aerodynamic force vector in velocity frame coordinates
v
gravF
v
Gravitational force vector in velocity frame coordinates
Fthrust Thrust force
v
thrustF
v
Thrust force vector in velocity frame coordinates
 Latitude
 Mean latitude
& Rate of change of latitude
gEarth Earth’s gravitational acceleration
I Inertial flight path angle
R Air-relative flight path angle
R& Rate of change of air-relative flight path angle
H Angular momentum
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He Helium
hfg Enthalpy of vaporization
I Moment of inertia tensor
i Inclination
Isp Engine specific impulse
J2 2nd-order harmonic coefficient
J3 3nd-order harmonic coefficient
L Lift force
l Reference length
L/D Lift-to-Drag ratio
m Mass
m& Rate of change of mass due to fuel consumption or ablation
b
aeroM
v
Aerodynamic torque vector in body frame coordinates
µE Gravitational-mass constant for Earth
b
thrustM
v
Thrust torque vector in body frame coordinates
n Mean orbit rate
N2H4 Hydrazine
P Rolling velocity
p Semi-latus rectum
P& Roll acceleration
Pburst Tank burst pressure
Poperating Tank operating pressure
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Q Pitching velocity
Q& Pitch acceleration
burnoutq Tank burnout flux
Qfail Failure integrated heating
failq Failure heating rate
Qnom Nominal integrated heating
Qref Integrated reference stagnation point heating
qref Reference stagnation point convective heating
 Celestial longitude measured from inertial frame
 Terrestrial longitude measured from the Greenwich meridian
& Rate of change of longitude

 0 Initial terrestrial longitude at trajectory initiation (constant value)
R Yawing velocity
r Spacecraft position radius
R& Yaw acceleration
r& Rate of change of spacecraft position radius
n
r
v
Spacecraft position vector in navigation frame coordinates
Rc Radius of cylinder
Re Reynolds number
n
Ir
v& Inertial velocity vector in navigation frame coordinates
v
Ir
v& Inertial velocity vector in velocity frame coordinates
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v
Ir
v&& Inertial acceleration vector in velocity frame coordinates
rinner Inner radius of hollow cylinder
router Outer radius of hollow cylinder
n
Rr
v& Air-relative velocity vector in navigation frame coordinates
n
Rr
v&& Air-relative acceleration vector in navigation frame coordinates
v
Rr
v& Air-relative velocity vector in velocity frame coordinates
v
Rr
v&& Air-relative acceleration vector in velocity frame coordinates
Rs Radius of sphere
2 Material density
2l Density of saturated liquid
2v Density of saturated vapor
2$ Freestream atmospheric density
sma Semi-major axis
smi Semi-minor axis
 Stefan-Boltzman constant = 5.67 x 10-12 W/(cm2:K4)
fg Surface tension of liquid-vapor
T Thrust
t Time
Ti Titanium
Tmelt Melting temperature
Toperating Tank operating temperature
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Troom Room temperature
U, V, W Vehicle inertial velocity vector components in inertial frame
b
aerov
v
Aerodynamic velocity vector in body frame coordinates
v
aerov
v Aerodynamic velocity vector in velocity frame coordinates
vI Inertial velocity
vR Air-relative velocity
Rv& Rate of change of air-relative speed
vwind Wind speed
v
windv
v Wind velocity vector in velocity frame coordinates
 Earth rate of rotation
LAN Longitude of ascending node
AOP Argument of periapsis
/
b
b Iv Angular velocity of the body frame relative to the inertial frame in body 
frame coordinates
/
n
n Rv Angular velocity of the navigation frame relative to the rotating frame in 
navigation frame coordinates
/
I
R Iv Angular velocity of the rotating frame relative to the inertial frame in 
inertial frame coordinates
/
v
v Iv Angular velocity of the velocity frame relative to the inertial frame in 
velocity frame coordinates
158
/
v
v Rv Angular velocity of the velocity frame relative to the rotating frame in 
velocity frame coordinates
X, Y, Z Vehicle position vector components in inertial frame
, ,X Y Z& & & Vehicle inertial velocity vector components in inertial frame
b
ax
v
Vector x observed in a-frame and expressed in b-frame coordinates
I Inertial azimuth angle
R Air-relative azimuth angle
R& Rate of change of air-relative azimuth
